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Foreword
Eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits is determined hi part 
by compliance to a set of nonmonetary requirements having to do with 
initial separation issues and continuing eligibility. The ability of states to 
ensure that claimants comply with these regulations and that those who 
do not are denied benefits depends on a number of legislative, regulatory 
and administrative factors. This study examines the various state laws 
and practices regarding nonmonetary regulations and assesses their ef 
fect on the ability of states to identify and reject unemployment in 
surance claimants who fail to meet the requirements. According to the 
authors, "the patterns observed in the analysis may suggest how certain 
practices can help state agencies (1) minimize the extent to which 
claimants violate nonmonetary eligibility rules, and (2) maximize the 
ability of agencies to detect violations when they occur and to reduce or 
deny benefits accordingly." This is essential to the equitable and efficient 
operation of the program.
Facts and observations expressed in the study are the sole responsibili 
ty of the authors. Their viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions 
of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.






Eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits is based on two sets of 
criteria: initial monetary and nonmonetary qualification requirements 
(which are based on previous employment), and continuing eligibility 
conditions (which are exhibited through continuing attachment to the 
labor market). Much of the burden for the equitable and efficient opera 
tion of the system rests on the nonmonetary standards for both initial 
(i.e., separation) and continuing (i.e., nonseparation) eligibility, yet, as 
they are applied, these standards do not easily lend themselves to review 
or understanding.
This monograph investigates the influence of state laws, regulations, 
and procedures on nonmonetary eligibility. Our objective is to identify 
practices that are particularly effective in detecting ineligible claimants, 
given the variation in the definitions of ineligibility. To the extent that we 
succeed hi establishing these "best practices," agencies might be able to 
monitor their procedures more effectively and possibly modify them to 
meet their own objectives. More specifically, the patterns observed in the 
analysis may suggest how certain practices can help state agencies 
(1) minimize the extent to which claimants violate nonmonetary eligibili 
ty rules, and (2) maximize the ability of agencies to detect violations 
when they occur and to reduce or deny benefits accordingly.
The research underlying the monograph represents a truly col 
laborative effort between program administrators and researchers. The 
research would not have been possible without the considerable coopera 
tion both of UI directors in the states we visited and of their staff hi state 
and local offices. Many people in the Department of Labor provided in 
valuable assistance during the study operations, as well as useful com 
ments on our work. They include William McGarrity (the study project 
officer), Wayne Zajac, Joseph Hight, Gene Biglin, and the late Edwin 
Kerley.
Paul Rynders and John Wichita of Mathematica Policy Research 
shared in the analytical effort. Wichita designed most of the process
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analysis field procedures, and he and Rynders conducted the on-site 
analysis. David Stevens of the University of Missouri and David Zim- 
merman of Mathematica Policy Research contributed then* substantial 
expertise to the design effort. Finally, Robert Spiegelman and Saul 
Blaustein of the W. E. Upjohn Institute provided valuable comments on 
an earlier draft of the monograph.
As always, the contents of this monograph represent only the views 
and interpretations of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the people or organizations who made its preparation possible.
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Executive Summary
This study focuses on the nonmonetary eligibility rules and their effect 
on the rates at which UI benefits are denied. It examines the variety of 
state laws and practices on nonmonetary requirements and their effect on 
the ability of states to identify and reject UI claimants who fail to meet 
the requirements. The rates at which claimants are denied benefits based 
on nonmonetary eligibility rules are used as a measure of the effec 
tiveness with which states are enforcing adherence to the rules.
STUDY DESIGN
This study was designed hi recognition that administering the UI pro 
gram is a complex undertaking: a wide range of legislative, regulatory, 
administrative, and personnel factors can potentially affect the ability of 
a state to ensure that UI claimants comply with the nonmonetary re 
quirements in order to receive benefits, and that those who do not are 
denied benefits. Several actions or inactions could lead to the violation of 
nonmonetary requirements and, hence, to benefit denial. They include 
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, inability to work or 
unavailability for work, and refusal of a job offer or referral. The study 
considers each of these issues individually.
Our approach for studying how various features of state programs af 
fect nonmonetary eligibility first entailed using the data sets that were 
already available hi published form to evaluate statistically the relation 
ship between each major category of nonmonetary eligibility (as 
measured by denial rates) and a set of variables that reflect easily iden 
tifiable provisions of state UI laws, quantifiable descriptors of the ad 
ministration of nonmonetary eligibility rules, indicators of the generosity 
of state programs, and descriptors of the economy and various other 
aspects of each state. This regression analysis, based on quarterly state 
data covering the period from 1964 to 1981, pointed out several 
systematic relationships between the policy variables that describe the 
state UI programs and the rates at which claimants are disqualified for 
nonmonetary reasons. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis based on 
these published data left many questions unanswered, and thus 
underscored the necessity of collecting primary data that would enable us 
to evaluate the relationship between program characteristics and non- 
monetary eligibility in greater detail.
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Our response was to conduct an "administrative," or "process," 
analysis in selected states. Its objective was to investigate state policies 
and practices in greater detail than was possible with published data, so 
as to (1) differentiate more clearly and precisely the variation in policies 
and administration that exists across states, and (2) discover how the 
laws, regulations, and administrative practices that create "effective 
policy" affect patterns of nonmonetary eligibility.
To conduct the process analysis, project staff selected six states for in 
tensive site visits, and collected data from relevant documents and 
through interviews with key state and local program officials. State selec 
tion was guided by the statistical analysis to ensure that the study states 
represented an appropriate range of denial rates for each issue.
FINDINGS
Several specific patterns emerged from the analysis that should be of 
interest to those who are responsible for monitoring nonmonetary 
eligibility. They are summarized below under five key topic headings. Of 
course, all conclusions must remain somewhat tentative because of 
(1) the nature of what can and cannot be observed (e.g., we can observe 
denial rates but not the rate at which ineligible individuals are deterred 
from applying), (2) an inability to demonstrate causality clearly through 
a process analysis, and (3) the relatively modest scale of this study.
1. The Importance of Issue Detection Relative to Fact-Finding and 
Adjudication
Given the set of eligibility requirements, the study found that the abili 
ty of a state to deny benefits to the ineligible population depends on the 
effectiveness with which it detects determination issues, rather than on 
the consistency with which its determinations lead to denials. The fre 
quency with which issues are detected is affected not only by eligibility 
policy, but also by a wide range of administrative guidelines and pro 
cedures that may vary from office to office hi terms of how they are ap 
plied, and that may be adhered to closely or loosely depending upon 
available staff resources, the pressure of claimant traffic, and the level of 
agency management control. For a variety of reasons, the process of 
fact-finding and adjudication is much more administratively confined; 
hence, the rate at which determinations lead to denials exhibits much less 
variation among the states than does the determination rate itself. By im 
plication, there is considerably more room for policy and management 
initiatives to improve the detection of determination issues than there is 
for such initiatives to improve the adjudication process.
2. Factors That Affect Success in Detecting Potential Eligibility Issues
In terms of detecting separation issues, the study found two important 
practices that seem to contribute to high determination rates. The first is 
the initiation of the determination process on the basis of information 
from several actors claimants, employers, or the agency itself rather 
than on a restricted set of acceptable sources for identifying particular 
issues. Low determination rates for separation issues are often associated 
with rules that restrict which party may raise an issue. The second prac 
tice, which clearly pertains to the first, is an insistence upon obtaining 
simple factual information from employers on the reasons for separa 
tion. This practice would imply that (1) employers' responses about the 
separation reasons be obtained before the initial claims are processed, 
and (2) employers be asked for a factual statement about the cir 
cumstances surrounding separation, rather than whether they had any 
reason to question a claimant's eligibility. Where persistent follow-up is 
undertaken to obtain an employer's response, procedures should 
recognize the principle that it is the agency and not the employer which 
bears responsibility for protecting the integrity of the eligibility process.
In terms of detecting nonseparation issues, three general factors that 
vary from state to state seem to affect determination rates. First, it seems 
clear that a formal requirement which stipulates that claimants engage in 
then- own active work search is a necessary foundation for effectively 
assessing then* exposure to the labor market hi terms of their work 
availability. However, although a formal work-search requirement is 
necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure that availability and refusal issues 
will be identified. Thus, the procedural definitions of evidence required 
to document adequate work search also seem to have an affect on the 
determination rate. Second, determination rates and, hence, denial rates 
also seem to depend on the purposefulness and frequency with which 
claimants' ongoing eligibility is questioned. One important aspect of this 
practice is that questions on claims cards should request simple factual 
statements from claimants, rather than to allow them to form subjective 
judgments about whether then* behavior is within eligibility norms and to 
incorporate them in then* answers. The other important aspect is the 
Eligibility Review Process (ERP). After the initial claim has been filed, 
ERP interviews often present the only routine opportunity for the agency 
to have personal contact with claimants. The ERP interviews should be 
scheduled relatively frequently, and they should entail a careful review of 
the extent to which a claimant is meeting the state's eligibility standards. 
Finally, the manner hi which ongoing claims reports are reviewed by UI
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staff also seems to be an important factor in the ability of states to detect 
nonseparation issues. Ongoing claims reports should be reviewed 
rigorously and consistently in accordance with each state's rules on 
claimant behavior.
3. Significance of the Severity of Penalties Imposed for Denials
More severe penalties seem to affect the behavior of claimants and 
potential claimants. We know, for example, that the denial of benefits 
for the duration of the unemployment spell has a negative impact on 
denial rates for most issues. These penalties may deter individuals from 
such actions as quitting a job or refusing a job offer. Moreover, more 
severe penalties may also be more likely to discourage individuals from 
applying if they suspect that their actions will render them ineligible for 
benefits.
The severity of penalties can also affect the UI program by influencing 
administrative behavior hi the determination process: some evidence sug 
gests that the option of milder penalties may increase the frequency with 
which agency staff deny benefits. However, although less severe 
penalties may lead to more denials, we do not recommend milder 
penalties as sound policy. First, they may simply encourage a greater 
number of applications from ineligible individuals. Second, at least to 
the extent that an agency has different degrees of violations (and 
penalties) to choose from, issues which warrant denial under more 
demanding standards may be pursued inadequately.
4. The Importance of Clear Policies and Procedures
In states that have more comprehensive and detailed written policies 
and procedures, the staffs understanding of state policy tends to be 
more accurate and consistent. Detailed and specific policies tend to 
restrict the amount of discretion that can be exercised by claims staff 
when considering each claimant's case. To the extent that the clarity of 
defined policy is effectively communicated to line staff, its effect should 
be to increase the consistency with which similar cases are treated in the 
determination process.
5. Organization of the Fact-Finding and Adjudication Process
As expressed previously, the study found that a broad view should be 
taken of the types of information that justify inquiry and some form of 
determination. Identifying a greater number of issues, rather than simply 
trying to justify only those issues that stand a good chance of leading to 
denial, seems more likely to lead to the effective denial of a high percent-
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age of truly ineligible cases. However, casting the broad net of potential 
issues certainly increases the workload imposed on staff who are respon 
sible for conducting fact-finding and determinations.
Thus, a related observation is that agencies must obviously find some 
way to work effectively under the workload burdens imposed by the 
greater frequency with which issues are detected in the determination 
process. The study noted two different approaches for doing so. First, by 
conducting some informal clarification and fact-finding before the for 
mal determination process, some states were able to eliminate some 
issues before reaching the point at which a formal written decision and 
notification were necessary.This approach reduced the workload to some 
extent by avoiding part of the work required hi a formal determination. 
In terms of the second approach, some states simply improved the effi 
ciency with which they conducted the determination process. The former 
approach often seemed to be associated with other practices that 
prevented valid issues from being identified. Thus, improving the effi 
ciency of the determination process seems to represent a sounder course 
for dealing with resource problems than would efforts to avoid for 
malities of the determination procedure.
Finally, our observations in the states underscore the importance of 
maximizing the information available to the adjudicator who is responsi 
ble for making termination decisions. This factor is important for the 
sake of rendering informed decisions that promote confidence hi the 
thoroughness an equitability of the determination process, and of 
avoiding frequent recourse to the appeals process.
Some tension obviously exists between the goals of conducting deter 
minations efficiently and maximizing the information that is developed 
through fact-finding. Insisting that employers and claimants be present 
for all fact-finding interviews hi which both are relevant not only is in- 
feasible but would also substantially increase the costs of the process in 
many cases unnecessarily. Some states conduct fact-finding hearings by 
telephone or perform separate contacts to gather information from the 
parties involved. No extreme solutions are suggested. However, two con 
cluding recommendations are offered. First, determination decisionmak- 
ing by staff who are not involved hi fact-finding, using primarily written 
summaries of facts and without personal contact with the parties, may be 
counterproductive, leading to an increased number of appeals. Second, 
states should encourage relevant parties to participate in a determination 
whenever it appears that their interests are at stake, and that there is 
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Unemployment insurance programs offer financial 
assistance to insured workers who have recently been 
separated from their jobs usually involuntarily and who 
have a continuing attachment to the labor market. 
Unemployment insurance (UI) is meant to provide income to 
workers deprived of then: jobs through no fault of their own, 
and who would be employed if they were able to secure a 
suitable job. To ensure that benefits are paid only to 
claimants who have substantive attachment to the labor 
market and who are unemployed through no fault of their 
own, state UI programs specify both monetary eligibility re 
quirements, pertaining to past employment and wages, and 
nonmonetary eligibility requirements, pertaining to the cir 
cumstances of job separation, claimants' continuing 
availability for work, and their willingness to accept it. Past 
employment and continuing availability for work are viewed 
as evidence that an individual has been and continues to be 
attached to the labor market and, if out of work, should be 
considered unemployed.
This study focuses on nonmonetary eligibility rules and 
their effect on the rates at which UI benefits are denied. It 
examines the variety of state laws and practices concerning 
nonmonetary requirements, and the effect of these laws and 
practices on the ability of states to identify and reject UI 
claimants who fail to meet the requirements. The rates at 
which claimants are denied benefits based on nonmonetary 
eligibility rules are used as a measure of the performance of 
states in enforcing adherence to the rules. Claimants may be
1
2 Introduction
denied benefits under these rules due to "separation issues" 
(the circumstances under which they left their last job) or to 
"continuing eligibility" issues (their availability for work, 
willingness to accept work, and search for employment).
Nonmonetary denial rates are one measure of the effec 
tiveness of the UI program in minimizing payments to in 
dividuals who do not meet nonmonetary eligibility stan 
dards, but they are not a perfect measure. Denial rates are 
certainly influenced by the effectiveness of a state agency in 
detecting claimants whose circumstances or actions make 
them ineligible. However, the frequency of payments to in- 
eligibles may also be affected by factors whose impacts are 
not reflected in denial rates, such as policies which 
discourage individuals from applying for benefits at all when 
they doubt their own eligibility. Thus, low denial rates do 
not necessarily indicate a failure to deny payments to in- 
eligibles, nor do high denial rates indicate success. They are, 
however, the major source of information on the outcomes 
of agency efforts to bar payments to ineligibles. Moreover, 
available data can be broken down into the separate rates at 
which issues are detected and at which benefits are actually 
denied, and are available for each reason for denial. They 
can thus be examined in detail and compared with quite 
specific characteristics of state policy and administration.
The motivation for this study lies in the wide variation in 
the states' nonmonetary denial rates and a corresponding 
diversity in state laws, regulations, and procedures that deal 
with nonmonetary eligibility. Our aim has been to identify 
aspects of state UI laws and regulations, and approaches for 
enforcing nonmonetary eligibility requirements ad 
ministratively, that seem to affect the rate at which claimants 
are denied benefits. Establishing relationships between 
methods for applying nonmonetary rules and denial rates 
may offer some help to states in their efforts to respond to
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fiscal pressures and concerns about the accuracy of program 
eligibility decisions.
This introductory chapter points out some of the variety hi 
state laws and practices that deal with nonmonetary eligibili 
ty, and the way in which this diversity reflects continuing 
debate about the appropriate goals of the UI program. 
Despite this diversity, all states have had to address concerns 
about the accuracy of program administration, particularly 
given the severe fiscal drains on program funds in recent 
years. The ways in which these demands have been felt and 
met are briefly described. Finally, as background to the 
detailed analysis presented later, this chapter explains the 
structure of nonmonetary eligibility rules.
A. Approaches to Nonmonetary Eligibility: State Variation
Like most aspects of unemployment insurance, non- 
monetary eligibility rules and their administration reflect the 
policy decisions, political attitudes, and economic conditions 
of the individual states. Despite the general framework of 
federal law on unemployment insurance, the variety of ap 
proaches adopted by states demonstrates a continuing lack 
of consensus on the appropriate strictness of UI eligibility 
decisions.
Because state UI programs are part of the federal-state 
system, they are constrained by federal standards, but they 
do retain wide discretion over their laws and practices. 
Federal law on nonmonetary eligibility deals primarily with 
two concerns: it defines and protects the substantive rights of 
claimants when a UI agency questions their availability or 
ability to work or then* refusal of job offers, and it defines 
their procedural rights in determinations or fair hearings. 1 In 
other respects, federal standards allow the states wide 
latitude.
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The variety of state approaches to nonmonetary eligibility 
rules and their enforcement illustrates the persistent tension 
between two competing views of the program: as a benefit 
program to protect employees, and as an employment 
stabilization program, paid for by employers to respond to 
their needs. Of course, all state UI programs hi fact respond 
to both views, but differences in UI law and administration 
suggest that patterns of public attitudes and political in 
fluences vary from state to state.
Much of the diversity among state programs is revealed 
only by a detailed examination of administrative practices 
and regulations, because on the surface the states' UI laws 
sound similar themes. One purpose of this study was to un 
cover these differences; for the sample of states included in 
this study, the variety of regulations and administrative en 
forcement will be explained hi later chapters. However, some 
brief examples of the divergences among state programs at 
this point can demonstrate why the inquiry into the effects of 
administrative variation on denial rates is of interest.
In their UI laws, the states adopt different approaches for 
defining the circumstances under which claimants should be 
denied benefits. For example, hi some states, claimants who 
leave a job voluntarily can immediately receive benefits only 
if they left with a "good cause" that was directly related to 
the conditions of employment (e.g., dangerous work condi 
tions). In other states, a variety of "compelling personal 
reasons" are considered good cause for leaving a job, in 
cluding such reasons as following one's spouse to a new loca 
tion or caring for an ill household member. The strictness 
with which states insist that an individual be able to work 
also varies. Some states base benefit denial on whether the 
worker is able to perform any type of gainful work that ex 
ists in the job market, while other states base benefit denial 
on whether claimants are in adequate health to work at oc-
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cupations for which their past experience and skills suit 
them. Penalties for quitting or refusing a job also vary wide 
ly among states, from relatively brief delays of as little as five 
weeks in benefits to disqualification for the duration of 
unemployment, to requirements for a subsequent period of 
new employment before a new spell of benefits can be claim 
ed.
Beyond differences in their laws, the states adopt quite dif 
ferent approaches for detecting noncompliance with eligibili 
ty requirements. Consequently, the effective strictness of 
nonmonetary requirements differs even between those states 
whose UI laws are similar. Some states, for instance, require 
claimants to search for jobs on then* own and to report their 
contacts with employers, and disqualify claimants who fail 
to report a sufficient number of contacts. In other states, ac 
tive job search may be required, but little effort is made to 
monitor claimants' efforts. Some states adhere to clear 
schedules for conducting personal eligibility review inter 
views, at which agency staff examine in detail the job 
demands set by claimants and their efforts to find work; 
other states conduct these interviews only sporadically and 
selectively.
The net effect of differences in laws and administration is 
that some states appear "liberal" and others "strict" in ap 
plying nonmonetary eligibility standards to claimants. Some 
states appear to tolerate paying benefits to individuals whose 
reasons for unemployment are not clearly involuntary, and 
whose continued attachment to the labor force might appear 
tenuous. In other states, the concerns of employers who pay 
for UI benefits appear to have led to stricter standards and 
closer attention to enforcement.
Nonetheless, states do not typically resolve UI policy 
issues once and for all. In most states, the definition of UI 
program rules and thus the balance between competing in-
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terests in the program is a matter of continuing debate. 
Revisions to UI law are a frequent subject of legislative bills 
debated each year. As political attitudes, economic 
pressures, and the composition of a state's industrial base 
and workforce change, new issues emerge that appear to call 
for program adjustments. The definition and enforcement of 
nonmonetary eligibility standards are part of this continuing 
debate.
B. Pressures to Tighten Nonmonetary Eligibility
Whatever the normal balance that is struck in various 
states between employers' and employees' interests in the UI 
program, all UI agencies are faced with shifting financial 
and political pressures on then* programs which can lead to 
changes in the definition and enforcement of eligibility rules. 
Economic conditions change for better or for worse, reliev 
ing or aggravating concerns about the balance between UI 
tax revenues and benefit disbursements. Evolving public at 
titudes about relying on government assistance programs 
may modify the balance of political pressures on state 
legislatures. Attention to the general administrative integrity 
of governmental programs, and their ability to carry out the 
intent of the legislature accurately, intensifies at times, par 
ticularly when administrative problems appear to contribute 
to a deterioration in the financial stability of a benefit pro 
gram.
The condition of the economy is clearly the primary exter 
nal factor that affects UI trust funds and can focus attention 
on ways to make the eligibility process more restrictive. In 
times of recession, more unemployed workers draw benefits 
from the trust fund, and declines in employer payrolls reduce 
tax payments into the trust funds. In response to trust fund 
problems, states can raise UI taxes, curtail benefit levels, and 
tighten both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility stan 
dards.
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Severe strains have been placed on UI trust funds by the 
recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. These 
strains are starkly depicted by the relationship between trust 
fund reserves and benefit payout rates. At the end of 1969, 
the "reserve ratio multiple" the ratio of trust fund reserves 
as a percentage of covered payrolls to total benefits paid as a 
percentage of covered payrolls exceeded 1.5 in 34 states 
and exceeded 1.0 in 16 other states. Ten years later, 38 states 
had reserve ratio multiples of less than 1.0. During the reces 
sions of 1980 and 1981-1982, 32 states saw then* trust funds 
go into the red at some point and were forced to borrow 
from the federal UI trust fund.2
The precarious condition of UI trust funds that resulted 
from the recent recessions stemmed at least in part from 
benefit eligibility policies and employer tax policies that 
combined to deplete trust funds far more rapidly than they 
could be replenished. Trust fund problems have been exacer 
bated hi some states by past trends towards liberalizing 
benefit levels and eligibility conditions and narrowing the 
definitions of employer tax liabilities. Although reserve 
balances are expected to be drawn down in recessions, the 
plunges in fund balances that occurred in these recent reces 
sions were unprecedented. The deterioration of state trust 
fund reserves has prompted state legislatures, UI agencies, 
and the federal government to focus renewed attention on 
the financing of the UI program, the monetary and non- 
monetary rules under which claimants qualify for benefits, 
and the integrity and rigor with which eligibility standards 
are administered.
One indication of the heightened concern about program 
integrity is the attention that has been focused on ways to im 
prove the accuracy of UI claim actions. State UI programs 
routinely conduct their own efforts to detect levels and pat 
terns of overpayments that are caused by erroneous decisions
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about or inaccurate information on monetary or non- 
monetary eligibility rules. In recent years, the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor initiated the Random Audit program, a pilot 
program to improve the monitoring of error rates and the 
sources of error in eligibility decisions. Federal concern for 
ensuring accurate measures of program errors has subse 
quently led to preliminary preparations for an expanded 
quality assurance program designed by the Department of 
Labor, which is scheduled to be implemented in 1986. 
Another example of recent attention to program administra 
tion, and specifically to nonmonetary eligibility, is the South 
Carolina Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstra 
tion. 3 This demonstration, funded by the Department of 
Labor, was designed to reduce UI payments by strengthening 
the UI work test, increasing job placements for UI 
claimants, helping claimants search for jobs, and improving 
the exchange of information between the Job Service and UI 
offices concerning claimant eligibility issues.
Federal incentives for improving state trust fund balances 
have also been strengthened, encouraging states to reex- 
amine not only then* nonmonetary eligibility rules but also 
their tax rules, benefit levels, and monetary eligibility re 
quirements. Under recent legislation, loans from the federal 
UI trust fund to debtor states now carry interest charges. 
States that enact legislation to improve their trust fund 
solvency, either through benefit reductions or tax increases, 
can limit federal penalty taxes, defer interest payments, and 
receive reductions in interest charges on outstanding debts. 
States, particularly those with the most severe trust fund 
deficits, have responded with program changes. All eight 
states with the largest debts hi 1982 passed important legisla 
tion between 1982 and 1984 to deal with solvency.4
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C. Nonmonetary Eligibility Rules
Qualification for UI benefits is based in all states on two 
sets of criteria monetary and nonmonetary. Monetary re 
quirements are imposed as part of the initial eligibility pro 
cess when individuals request benefits, and pertain to their 
record of past employment and wages. Nonmonetary re 
quirements are imposed for both initial and continuing 
eligibility. Monetary qualification issues are not within the 
scope of this study; they are discussed in this report only in 
connection with disqualification penalties for nonmonetary 
issues that require reestablishing monetary qualification.
Initial nonmonetary eligibility rules are codified in each 
state's definition of "negative disqualifying actions" those 
actions or behavior by claimants which, if found to be the 
cause of job separation, would be cause for benefit denial. 
These include voluntary quits, misconduct, involvement in 
labor disputes, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Claimants 
disqualified under these rules may not receive benefits during 
a defined nonentitlement period, whose length is fixed for 
some issues in some states and is subject to some ad 
ministrative discretion in others.
Continuing eligibility rules require two positive condi 
tions the availability for and the ability to work and the 
absence of one negative action a refusal to accept available 
and suitable work. Failure to satisfy either of the first two 
conditions makes claimants ineligible only as long as they re 
main "unavailable" or "unable" (with a one-week 
minimum period of ineligibility). Unwillingness to accept 
available suitable work leads to disqualification for a 
specified period defined hi each state's statutes. Compliance 
with all of these conditions is required for continuing benefit 
entitlement.
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The process of identifying noncompliance with either in 
itial (i.e., separation) or continuing (i.e., nonseparation) 
eligibility standards is called "eligibility determination." 
The first step of the determination process is 
"fact-finding" collecting information from the claimant 
and other interested parties. Fact-finding is followed by a 
formal review or hearing and a decision about whether or 
not to deny benefits, depending upon the merits of the case 
and the interpretation of the rules. In some instances, infor 
mal fact-finding may precede this process, but claimants 
cannot be denied benefits without undergoing a formal 
determination. Determination decisions can be appealed to 
separate appeals units within the state UI agency. In most 
states, there are actually two levels of appeals possible, 
although most appeals go no further than the first level (or 
"lower authority").
Although all state programs share these basic elements of 
nonmonetary eligibility policy, wide variation exists in the 
details of their eligibility rules, the level of detail and preci 
sion achieved in then* legislation and regulations, the rigor 
and consistency with which they enforce rules, the methods 
they use to detect nonmonetary issues, and the procedures 
they use for fact-finding and for formulating determination 
decisions. The wide diversity among the state programs in 
nonmonetary eligibility rules and practices is evidence of the 
relatively modest role of federal legislation in this aspect of 
unemployment insurance, the wide latitude granted to the 
states, and the variety of political, economic, and managerial 
factors that help define and implement the program.
D. Overview of the Study
We approached this study on the influences of state laws, 
regulations, and procedures on nonmonetary denial rates in 
two ways. The first was to use available published data to
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analyze the statistical relationships between denial rates and 
the characteristics of state laws. Two sets of variables were 
used for this analysis. One set consists of denial rates for the 
four standard denial reasons voluntary leaves or quits, 
misconduct, not able or available, and refusal of suitable 
work. These rates were used as outcome variables. The other 
set used as explanatory variables in the statistical 
model consists of easily identifiable provisions of state UI 
laws, quantifiable descriptors of the administration of non- 
monetary eligibility rules, measures of the generosity of state 
UI programs, and descriptors of the economy and other 
characteristics of each state. As described in chapter 2, a 
regression analysis based on quarterly state data covering the 
period from 1964 through 1981 revealed certain relationships 
between these explanatory variables and denial rates. Never 
theless, this statistical analysis inevitably left many questions 
unanswered, and served primarily to point out the necessity 
for (and direction of) further investigation. In particular, 
our limited ability to characterize state programs with 
available published data meant that a great deal of the varia 
tion in denial rates remained unexplained by the equations 
estimated with our model.
Thus, the second approach taken in the study was an "ad 
ministrative," or "process," analysis in selected states. Our 
objective was to investigate state policies and practices in 
greater detail than was possible with published data, in order 
to (1) differentiate more clearly and precisely the variation in 
policies and administrative practices across states, and 
(2) discover how the laws, regulations, and administrative 
practices that create the "effective policy" influence patterns 
of nonmonetary eligibility and denial rates.
To conduct the process analysis, project staff selected six 
states for intensive site visits, and collected data from rele 
vant documents and in-person interviews with key in-
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dividuals in state UI agency offices and field offices. This ef 
fort was designed to gather information about the full range 
of factors that determine actual policy as implemented in the 
states, and to do so by examining the UI program in each 
state from a variety of perspectives. Chapter 3 describes the 
process analysis methodology.
Generalizing from a study with only six judgmentally 
selected states is difficult at best, although the states were 
selected carefully to ensure that a range of program models 
was represented. Nevertheless, this portion of the study did 
produce a rich body of information that enables us to 
distinguish among different approaches to administering UI 
programs, including then* major statutory, regulatory, and 
procedural features. Although identifying relationships be 
tween these features and the differences in nonmonetary 
eligibility rates requires a high degree of judgment, we feel 
that we have identified several key relationships and have ob 
tained some evidence to suggest others. Chapter 4 presents a 
basic description of state program characteristics which con 
stitute the "raw" data of the process analysis. Chapter 5 
then returns to the main focus of this study to evaluate what 
we have learned from the process analysis about the effects 
of state policies and procedures on nonmonetary eligibility.
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September 1984.
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The first part of this study on UI nonmonetary eligibility 
rules attempted to identify how state rules and program en 
vironments relate statistically to denial rates for separation 
and nonseparation issues. This chapter explains the 
statistical analysis in four steps. First, we present data that il 
lustrate the considerable range of denial rates across states. 
We then discuss the variables that could potentially influence 
denial rates, and their anticipated effects. In the third section 
of the chapter, we describe the data for the statistical 
analysis and the analytical methodologies. In the final sec 
tion, we report the results of the analysis and then: limita 
tions.
A. State Denial Rates
The nonmonetary denial rates reported by the states to the 
Employment and Training Administration consist of two 
different types of details. First, rates are broken down into 
the two key stages of the nonmonetary eligibility decision 
process: determination and denial. Determination rates 
represent the number of nonmonetary issues detected and in 
vestigated per 1,000 spells of insured unemployment for 
separation issues, or per 1,000 claimant contacts (weekly 
claims) for nonseparation issues. Net denial rates indicate 
the number of claimants who are actually denied benefits per 
1,000 spells or contacts. The net denial rate can be divided by
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the determination rate to compute the percentage of deter 
minations that lead to denials.
Second, the two key stages of the nonmonetary eligibility 
process (determination and net denial rates) are also broken 
down separately into quits and misconduct that is, separa 
tion issues and "able and available" and job refusal that 
is, nonseparation issues.
As shown in table 2.1, net denial rates vary widely from 
state to state. For example, while the average state denial 
rate for voluntary quits was 54.9 per 1,000 new spells of in 
sured unemployment in 1982, the rate ranged from a high of 
224.5 in Nebraska to a low of 12.9 in Pennsylvania. The 
voluntary quit denial rates of the 10 states with the highest 
rates were more than twice the national average. The denial 
rates of states also exhibit a wide range of variation in terms 
of misconduct issues, from 103.1 to 7.9. The denial rates of 
states vary to a slightly lesser degree in terms of nonsepara 
tion issues: 21.9 to 0.6 for able and available issues, and 0.7 
to 0.0 for refusal of suitable work.
When the net denial rate and the determination rate are 
compared (see table 2.2), it is clear that some states rank 
quite differently in terms of detecting issues and denying 
benefits based on determinations. For example, the deter 
mination rate of South Dakota ranks 22nd in terms of 
separation issues, but its denial rate ranks 43rd because of 
the extremely low proportion of determinations that lead to 
denials. In Nevada, the opposite is true for nonseparation 
issues; the determination rate of Nevada ranks 31st, but its 
overall denial rate ranks 17th. Why some states appear to 
detect issues at a very high or low rate while others seem to 
deny benefits in a high or low percentage of cases is an im 
portant research issue, as is the significance of these 
measures as indicators of the ability of a state to preserve 
program integrity.
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Table 2.1 
Nonmonetary Denial Rates by State, 1982a
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Table 2.1 (continued)






















































































































SOURCE: Unpublished tables provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service, Employ 
ment and Training Administration.
a. Separation issue rates are reported per 1,000 new spells of insured unemployment, and 
nonseparation issue rates are reported per 1,000 claimant contacts.
Table 2.2 
Determination and Denial Rates by State, 1982*












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Unpublished tables provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service, Employment and Training Administration, 
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In general, however, states with high or low denial rates 
for separation or nonseparation issues have correspondingly 
high or low determination rates. For example, in terms of 
separation issues, nine of the top ten states whose determina 
tion rate is among the highest also rank in the top ten in 
terms of the denial rate. For nonseparation issues, the cor 
responding figure is seven of ten, with two of the three re 
maining states ranking within the top fifteen. Similarly, 
states whose determination rate ranks among the lowest also 
rank among the lowest in denial rates. This pattern suggests 
that, in explaining denial rates, it is just as important to ex 
amine the factors that affect the number of determinations 
that are made as it is to consider the factors that affect how 
often determinations lead to denials. Some factors may of 
course affect both rates. For example, state laws that ex 
plicitly define reasons for benefit denial for able and 
available issues will probably lead to relatively high rates at 
which determinations lead to denials, but they will probably 
also increase the number of determinations made, because 
potential issues will be more apparent to UI staff.
B. Determinants of Denial Rates
Nonmonetary denial rates can potentially be affected by a 
variety of factors some are internal to the UI system, while 
others are external to the UI system, such as characteristics 
of the economy. Within the constraints of available data, the 
statistical analysis was designed to estimate the effect of five 
internal or external factors on denial rates: (1) the 
characteristics of state laws; (2) the thoroughness of the ad 
ministrative process in UI determinations; (3) the generosity 
of UI benefits; (4) the state of the economy; and (5) the 
general philosophy of the state towards UI claimants. 
Although only limited information on these factors could be 
incorporated into the statistical analysis, it is important to 
distinguish among the expected effects of each on denial 
rates.
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Characteristics of State Laws
Two types of variation that are readily discernible in state 
laws can be viewed as potential influences on denial rates: 
the severity of disqualification penalties, and the stringency 
of the rules that must be satisfied by claimants to qualify for 
benefits. Based on the information on state laws compiled in 
the U.S. Department of Labor's Comparison of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws, three variables that 
describe penalties and four that describe the stringency of 
eligibility requirements were identified for the analysis. Each 
was defined as a "yes" or "no" variable (1 or 0, respective 
ly, for purposes of the statistical analysis). These variables 
are as follows:
  Duration of Disqualification for Voluntary Quit. If 
claimants who have quit without good cause are dis 
qualified for the duration of the spell of unemploy 
ment, the variable has a value of "1." If the dis 
qualification is less severe and is set for some specific 
term, the variable is set to "0."
  Duration of Disqualification for Misconduct. 
Similarly, disqualification for the full period of 
unemployment sets this variable to "1," and a 
specific term of disqualification sets it to "0."
  Duration of Disqualification for Refusal of Suitable 
Work. Claimants who refuse a job offer may be dis 
qualified for the full period of unemployment, hi 
which case the variable is set to "1." If shorter dis 
qualification periods are imposed, the variable is 
"0."
  Good Cause Restricted to Employment-Related 
Reasons. If state law limits acceptable reasons for a 
voluntary quit to reasons that pertain to the condi 
tions of employment, this variable is set to "1." If
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state law does not restrict acceptable reasons in this 
manner and allows compelling personal reasons or 
other nonemployment-related reasons, the law is 
viewed as less stringent, and the variable is set to "0."
  Suitable Work. This variable is set to "1" if the state 
requires that the claimant be able and available only 
for work deemed suitable. A more stringent require 
ment, at least in theory, is an unqualified require 
ment, without reference to the suitability of work. 
This variable is set to "0" for states with such un 
qualified requirements.
  Usual Occupation. This variable is set equal to "1" if 
the state requires that the individual be able and 
available for work only in the usual occupation or for 
an occupation in which the individual is reasonably 
suited by prior training or experience, and "0" other 
wise. Requiring availability for "usual" work is 
another way to qualify the able and available rule to 
make it more lenient. This variable and the suitable 
work variable are thus mutually exclusive.
  Actively Seeking Work. This variable is set equal to 
"1" if the state requires that the individual engage in 
active work search as evidence of his/her availability. 
It is set to "0" if no such requirement is stated in the 
law.
Disqualification penalties can be expected to affect denial 
rates in several ways. First, we expect that more severe dis 
qualification penalties will discourage UI application by in 
dividuals who have quit their jobs, because they will perceive 
a lower likelihood of receiving benefits. In addition, we ex 
pect that more severe disqualification penalties would reduce 
the overall number of individuals who quit their jobs, 
because the chances of being able to fall back on UI benefits
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to replace employment income are perceived as lower than if 
a limited disqualification period were anticipated. We 
assume, however, that the severity of the disqualification 
penalty will not affect agency denial decisions in any given 
determination. Given these assumptions, we concluded that 
more severe disqualification penalties are likely to reduce 
denial rates by deterring claimants from quitting and apply 
ing for benefits. We thus expected that disqualification for 
the duration of unemployment (for voluntary quits, miscon 
duct, or refusal of suitable work) would have a negative ef 
fect on denial rates for each of those respective reasons.
For the four state law variables that indicate the relative 
stringency of requirements imposed on claimants, we 
hypothesized that more restrictive definitions of acceptable 
reasons for leaving a job, seeking work, or responding to of 
fers would increase the likelihood that agencies would find 
claimants ineligible. This hypothesis reflects the assumption 
that more stringent requirements for accepting work or being 
available for jobs and for conditions of voluntary quit will 
not have substantial effects on individuals' behavior. Thus, 
with a fixed pattern of claimant behavior, more stringent re 
quirements will increase the percentage of claimants who fall 
outside defined eligibility standards, are detected as being 
potentially ineligible, and are denied benefits as a result of a 
determination. This hypothesis contrasts with our expecta 
tions about the effect of disqualification penalties, which we 
hypothesized would affect primarily the decisions of 
employees and potential claimants. In this case, more strin 
gent requirements are hypothesized to affect agency detec 
tion and decisions, rather than the rate at which persons 
leave jobs voluntarily, the definitions they formulate of the 
work they will accept, and their responses to job offers.
Therefore, for the state law variables that pertain to good 
cause restriction, suitable work and usual occupation provi-
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sions, and active work search requirements, we anticipated 
that greater stringency would be associated with higher 
denial rates. However, since we defined these four variables 
differently, some of the variables can be expected to have 
negative effects and others positive effects. Because the 
"good cause" and the "active work search" variables are 
defined so that a value of "1" implies greater stringency, 
their effect on denial rates was expected to be positive. 
However, provisions pertaining to suitable work and usual 
occupation are defined so that "1" indicates a more lenient 
policy; thus, these variables are expected to have a negative 
effect on denial rates. The hypothesized effects of state law 
provisions are summarized in table 2.3.
Table 23 
Expected Effects of State Laws on Denial Rates
Denial fon
Not able Refusal of 









































We also considered another set of internal UI variables 
that may affect denial rates namely, variables that describe 
the administration of nonmonetary eligibility determina 
tions. For this analysis, we used variables that describe both
Determinants of Denial Rates 27
the amount of time devoted to completing each determina 
tion and the timeliness and quality of these determinations. 
Data available from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Ser 
vice provide measures of these variables for separation and 
nonseparation issues: (1) minutes per unit (a measure of time 
devoted to each determination); (2) the percentage of deter 
minations completed within a federally defined time stan 
dard; and (3) the percentage of determinations found correct 
in quality control audits.
We had no specific expectations about the overall effect of 
these administrative variables, because equally plausible 
hypotheses suggest opposite effects on denial rates. For ex 
ample, states that devote a greater amount of time to each 
determination might uncover additional issues or more 
evidence to support denials, which could of course raise 
denial rates. On the other hand, devoting more time to deter 
minations could increase the chances that extenuating cir 
cumstances to support the claimant's actions are fully ex 
plored, which could of course tend to lower denial rates.
Generosity of UI Benefits
Several variables that are included in our analysis describe 
the level of UI benefits and the interaction between benefits 
and external economic factors that affect the relative attrac 
tiveness of the UI program. These variables are the average 
wage-replacement rate (average weekly benefits divided by 
average weekly earnings), the average potential duration of 
benefits, and a binary variable that indicates periods in 
which federal extended benefits (EBs) are available. Higher 
values of each of these variables indicate more generous UI 
benefits or benefits that compare more favorably to lost 
wages. We hypothesized that these factors would make the 
receipt of UI more attractive, and thus increase the propor 
tion of "truly ineligible" individuals who would attempt to
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collect UI benefits. Thus, we expected these variables to have 
a positive effect on denial rates pertaining to all of the denial 
reasons.
Characteristics of the Economy
Another set of variables included in our statistical analysis 
describes the state of the economy (based on the insured 
unemployment rate) and the composition of the unemployed 
population (based on the percent in construction, the percent 
in manufacturing, the percent male, and the percent age 25 
and under and age 55 and over). We hypothesized that a 
higher unemployment rate would reduce denial rates because 
workers would be less likely to quit jobs and because fewer 
job offers would exist that could be refused.
We also expected that the proportion of claimants in con 
struction and manufacturing would have a negative effect on 
denial rates because of the high rates of unionization and the 
high proportion of temporary layoffs followed by recall, as 
are characteristic of these industries. In many states, 
claimants in unions are exempt from UI work-search re 
quirements if they normally obtain work through the union 
(this exception is particularly true in the construction in 
dustry). A high incidence of temporary layoffs would 
presumably also reduce the proportion of job separations 
which are caused by quits. We also considered unionization 
more directly by using the percentage of each state's 
workforce that is unionized as an independent variable that 
could explain variations in denial rates.
For the demographic variables, we expected that the pro 
portion of the unemployed who are male would have a 
negative impact on denials, but that higher proportions of 
both younger and older claimants would raise denial rates. 
These hypotheses were based on the assumption that groups 
which are usually considered to have more marginal at-
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tachments to the labor force than do other groups would be 
more likely to be denied benefits.
General Attitudes Toward UI Claimants
A final factor that may influence denial rates is the general 
philosophy of each state toward UI claimants. For example, 
states may differ in the degree to which they emphasize either 
the claimants' or the employers' rights in issues pertaining to 
voluntary quits. They might also differ in the degree to 
which they believe that monitoring work-search activities 
carefully is a necessary and appropriate activity of the UI 
agency. No direct measures of such general attitudes were 
available, but we included as a proxy variable the average 
score of each state's congressional delegation on the AFL- 
CIO index that rates voting records. It was expected that 
higher ratings (indicating greater support of labor interests) 
would be associated with lower denial rates.
C The Data
The primary data used to examine the impact of the fac 
tors discussed above on denial rates were quarterly data by 
state (50 states and the District of Columbia) for the period 
from 1964 through 1981. The bulk of the data were derived 
from reports on claims activities submitted by the states to 
the Department of Labor. The variables that describe state 
laws were constructed from tables describing state laws 
which were published continuously in the Comparison of 
State UI Laws throughout the observation period. Thus, 
these variables describe not only current state laws but also 
how they have changed over time.
Several data items were not available for the entire tune 
period. For example, data on the ages of claimants were 
available only for 1969 through 1981; they were used only 
when the models were estimated over this shorter time
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period. The data on program administration, the degree of 
workforce unionization, and the AFL-CIO rating of the con 
gressional delegation were collected for a single year (1981). 
Thus, they were used only in a secondary analysis which ex 
amined the state-by-state differences that remained after the 
analysis based on the full 18-year data set was completed.
Several comments on the data summarized hi table 2.4 are 
of interest. Comparing the four denial rates presented in 
table 2.4 with the data in table 2.1 shows that denial rates 
were generally lower in 1982 than for the 1964-1981 period. 
This finding applied particularly to the quit denial rate 
(which in 1982 was about 65 percent of the 1964-1981 
average) and to the refusal-of-suitable-work denial rate 
(which was 0.8 for the entire period and 0.2 for 1982). l These 
differences may be due to the high unemployment experienc 
ed hi 1982, since more detailed annual data show that the 
1982 decrease in denial rates was a recent phenomenon that 
did not show up as part of a trend in the 1964-1981 data used 
for our analysis.
An examination of the detailed year-by-year data that 
underlie table 2.4 revealed that state laws on nonmonetary 
eligibility became stricter over the period from 1964 to 1981. 
For example, at the beginning of this period, about half of 
the states disqualified for the full duration of the unemploy 
ment spell those claimants who had quit jobs voluntarily. At 
the end of the period, 80 percent of the states imposed dis 
qualification for the full duration. Similar changes occurred 
in penalties for misconduct separation and refusal of suitable 
work; the proportion of states that disqualify the claimant 
for the duration of unemployment increased over this 
period. Similarly, the proportion of states that restrict good 
cause for voluntary quit to job-related reasons and that re 
quire active work search also increased. However, little 
change occurred in the number of states whose laws qualified
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Table 2.4
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 





Not able or available denial rate
Refusal of suitable work denial rate
Independent variables
Denial for voluntary leaving is for duration
Good cause restricted




Denial for refusing suitable work is for duration
Wage replacement rate
Average potential duration
Extended benefits dummy variable
Insured unemployment rate
Percent insured unemployed in construction
Percent insured unemployed in manufacturing
Percent insured unemployed who are men 
Percent insured unemployed age 55 and over" 
Percent insured unemployed age 25 and under"
Minutes per unit for separation issue administration0 
Minutes per unit for nonseparation issue administration0
Percent of separation issue determinations
done within time standard6
Percent of nonseparation issue determinations
done within time standard6
Percent of separation issue determinations
judged to be of acceptable quality6
Percent of nonseparation issue determinations
judged to be of acceptable quality0
Percent of labor force unionized0




























































SOURCE: Most variables were collected from reports filed by the states with DOL on the 
operation of the UI system and published in UI Statistics. Data on recent time periods have 
not been published, and they were collected directly from the Unemployment Insurance 
Service. The data on administrative time and on the timeliness and quality of determina 
tions were also collected from the UIS. Finally, the AFL-CIO rating variable was con 
structed from data reported in Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, "The Almanac of 
American Politics, 1984," National Journal. Washington, DC, 1983. 
a. Unless npted, the means and standard deviations are for 51 states for the 1964-1981 
period.
b. Variables available for the 1969-1981 period. 
c. Variables available for 1981.
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"able and available" requirements by restricting them to 
"suitable" or "usual" work.
D. Econometric Results
We tested the hypotheses on the determinants of non- 
monetary denial rates by estimating models in which the four 
denial rates represented dependent variables, and in which 
state laws, other UI characteristics, and external economic 
factors represented independent variables. 2 The models were 
estimated with quarterly data by state for the 1964-1981 
period for variables for which data were available for this en 
tire period. 3 Models were also estimated to examine the in 
fluence of variables for which more limited data were 
available (see below). The estimation of these models sup 
ports the hypotheses on the effects of some of the factors 
used as independent variables, but also underscores the 
limitations of the data available for the analysis.
In the estimated model, some of the state law provisions 
on disqualifications and the stringency of requirements have 
the anticipated effects on denial rates. Denial for the dura 
tion of employment based on voluntary quit, job refusal, or 
misconduct has a negative effect on the denial rate, as an 
ticipated. The effects of disqualification for the duration on 
the first two rates (for quit and job refusal) were statistically 
significant and sizeable in both cases about 20 percent of 
the mean value for the respective denial rates. Limiting the 
definition of good cause for voluntary quits to employment- 
related reasons has the anticipated positive effect on the 
related denial rate and is significant. The other state law 
characteristics, which pertain to the use of "suitable" and 
"usual" as qualifiers of the able and available requirements 
and to work-search requirements, do not have significant ef 
fects.
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Results of an analysis of the demographic characteristics 
of the unemployed population provided support for some of 
our hypotheses on the determinants of denial rates. The in 
sured unemployment rate has a negative impact on denial 
rates, as expected, and has a particularly large impact on the 
refusal-of-suitable-work denial rate, as one might expect. 
Certain characteristics of claimants, such as the percentage 
of the insured unemployed in construction and manufactur 
ing and the percentage who are male, have significant 
negative effects on denial rates.
However, the effects of the age structure of the 
unemployed population did not support our expectations. 
Higher percentages of younger workers (under age 25) tend 
ed to decrease denial rates for nonseparation issues, which 
was contrary to our hypothesis, and had no significant effect 
on denial rates for separation issues. Higher proportions of 
older workers had mixed effects, reducing misconduct denial 
rates and increasing the refusal-of-suitable-work denial 
rates.
The effects of variables that describe the generosity of UI 
benefits (average potential duration, the EB binary, and the 
wage-replacement ratio) are inconsistent hi the estimated 
models. All three have statistically significant effects on at 
least some denial rates, but the signs of the coefficients are 
not always in the expected direction. In some instances, more 
generous programs appear to have a negative, rather than a 
positive, effect on denial rates.
Although the statistical analysis described in this chapter 
generally confirmed some of our hypotheses, the results re 
main somewhat inconsistent and suggest that other impor 
tant factors are at work in the state UI programs and their 
environments which are not fully captured by the variables 
we defined or by the data available. One indication of the 
importance of those factors that are not included or not well
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represented hi the analysis is the fact that the coefficients 
estimated for the state binary variables that were included in 
the models were statistically significant as a group, and that 
many individual state coefficients were also statistically 
significant. Thus, while other variables explain some of the 
cross-state variation hi denial states, much of the variation 
can still be viewed as state-specific, or at least cannot be ex 
plained by the variables included in the regressions that used 
the data available for the entire 1964-1981 period.
In an attempt to enhance our ability to explain variations 
in state denial rates further, we undertook a secondary 
analysis of the state binary variable coefficients, using addi 
tional independent variables that were not included in the 
main analysis (again, because they were not available for the 
entire analysis period). The coefficients of the state binary 
variables are essentially a measure of the average residual 
variation for each state as compared with the excluded state. 
In the secondary analysis, these residual coefficients were 
used as the outcome variables. They were regressed against 
several variables that described UI administrative factors, 
the degree of labor force unionization, and the state congres 
sional delegations' average ranking on the AFL-CIO rating 
of legislative votes. These variables were available only for 
one year, 1981. None of the administrative variables showed 
any significant effect on denial rates in this analysis. 
However,the level of unionization and the AFL-CIO rank 
ing, when used separately in regression equations, did have 
some effect. The extent of unionization had a significant 
negative effect on denial rate residuals for separation and 
nonseparation issues, and the AFL-CIO rating had a signifi 
cant negative effect for separation issues. These effects sug 
gest that the political climate of the states can in some way 
affect denial rates.
The significant effects of state binary variables in explain 
ing denial rate variation, as well as the limited ability of
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other variables to explain denial rates, confirm the impor 
tance of looking beyond the readily available published 
characteristics of the state UI programs and the state 
economies. In effect, we would like to be able to "measure** 
both the stringency of requirements imposed on claimants 
and the severity of disqualification penalties with greater 
subtlety than was possible based on simple distinctions of 
language hi state laws. Moreover, we would like to gauge the 
importance of effective nonmonetary rules as they are ap 
plied, rather than as they are delineated by legislative intent. 
Thus, to carry out this type of analysis, we shifted from a 
quantitative analysis of data for all states to an intensive ex 
amination of how nonmonetary rules are administered in a 
small sample of states. The following chapters explain how 
we conducted this analysis and its conclusions.
NOTES
1. The 1964-1981 data set represents the average per quarter, while the 
1982 set represents the average over an entire year. Averages based on 
quarterly versus annual data account for some differences among the 
rates, but they do not account for all of the differences.
2. In addition to the basic set of independent variables discussed above, 
we included both quarterly binary variables to control for several effects 
and state binary variables to control for any remaining state effects and 
to provide a convenient way to compare states. We also controlled for 
autocorrelation hi the error term by state.
3. The estimated coefficients are reported hi the tables appended to this 
chapter.
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NOTE: These equations were estimated with a fixed-effects model. Similar results were ob 
tained with a random-effects model. 
•Statistically significant at .05 level for a two-tailed test, 





Determining nonmonetary eligibility in the unemployment 
insurance program is a complex undertaking. A wide range 
of legislative, regulatory, administrative, and personnel fac 
tors can potentially affect the ability of a state to ensure that 
UI claimants comply with nonmonetary requirements and 
that those who do not are denied benefits.
The regression analysis reported in the previous chapter is 
the first step hi explaining the factors that contribute to the 
variation hi the rates at which states deny benefits to UI 
claimants for four nonmonetary reasons—voluntary quits, 
discharge for misconduct, inability to work or unavailability 
for work, and refusal of a job offer or referral. However, as 
was recognized in the design of this study, the regression 
analysis contains certain inevitable shortcomings that limit 
the extent to which it can explain the impact of state UI agen 
cy operations on observed denial rates.
The major shortcoming of the regression analysis is that 
the readily available data on program administration are 
limited in their extent, type, and precision. In the analysis, 
three dummy variables represent the severity of penalties im 
posed for violating nonmonetary eligibility rules, and four 
others represent the latitude allowed to claimants in choosing 
to seek or accept work or to leave a job. All of these 
variables reduce variations among the states to binary 
values, which oversimplifies the true variety of state 
penalties for the violations and requirements imposed on
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claimants. Most seriously, perhaps, the values of the 
variables used in the regression analysis are drawn only from 
the state laws that pertain to unemployment compensation. 
The rules governing UI nonmonetary eligibility are a product 
of state laws, elaborative regulations, formal policy and pro 
cedural memoranda and handbooks, and informal rules of 
thumb used by the UI agencies. States with apparently 
similar legislative provisions may in fact be applying quite 
different rules because of the substantial divergence in 
regulatory provisions and practice. Conversely, states with 
apparent differences in legislative language may be observing 
actually very similar nonmonetary rules because they have 
placed different levels of substantive detail in their legisla 
tion. To the extent that this is true, regression analysis 
variables that describe state rules do not adequately repre 
sent effective policies.
Despite these limitations, the regression analysis suggests 
several systematic relationships between the policy variables 
that describe the state UI programs and the rates at which 
claimants are disqualified for nonmonetary reasons. With 
respect to voluntary quits and refusals of work, states that 
impose disqualifications for the duration of unemployment, 
as opposed to some fixed term, tend to have lower denial 
rates. States which restrict their definitions of good cause for 
leaving a job to reasons pertaining directly to the employ 
ment situation tend to have higher rates of denial for volun 
tary leaves relative to states which allow more personal 
reasons as a valid justification. However, these regression 
results do not suggest the mechanisms by which these dif 
ferences hi state policies might affect denial outcomes.
The process analysis component of this study is designed 
to investigate state policy and administrative practices hi 
greater detail in an attempt to (1) describe more clearly and 
precisely the differences among states with respect to policy
Process Analysis Methodology 43
and administration, and (2) discover how the laws, regula 
tions, and administrative practices which create the "effec 
tive policy" affect patterns of nonmonetary eligibility and 
denial rates. This chapter describes the methodology used in 
the process analysis.
Again, to conduct the process analysis, project staff 
selected six states for intensive site visits, and collected data 
hi those states from relevant documents and personal inter 
views in state and UI local offices. The purpose of the pro 
cess analysis design was to gather information about the full 
range of factors that determine the policies actually im 
plemented, and to do so by examining the UI system in each 
state from a variety of perspectives. The remaining sections 
of this chapter describe the process by which the sites were 
selected, the data that were to be collected during the site 
visits, the data collection approach, and the limitations with 
this methodology.
We chose six states for the study, which represented both 
the maximum number feasible with the resources available 
for the study and the number we felt was necessary as a basis 
for drawing any generalization about the implications of 
alternative statutes, policies, and procedures. However, the 
number does suggest certain limitations with the study. In 
particular, the sample is not large enough to enable us to 
select a set of states and sites within states that would truly be 
representative of the national pattern of nonmonetary 
eligibility standards. Thus, the analysis cannot provide 
statistically reliable conclusions about monetary eligibility 
standards. It does, however, enable us to point out patterns 
that may suggest avenues for state policy development.
A. Site Selection
Site selection for the process analysis occurred in three 
stages. First, we developed a set of criteria for selecting states
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in consultation with the Department of Labor and carried 
out the analysis required to derive a list of recommended 
states. Second, the list of recommended states was revised 
because the peculiarities of some of the recommended state 
programs might have limited our ability to generalize about 
UI programs in other states. Third, based on these first two 
stages, a final list of states was obtained, criteria were defin 
ed for selecting local sites within the states, and ar 
rangements were made for selecting the local sites with state 
officials.
Obtaining the cooperation of the states and the participa 
tion of individual respondents during the site visits required 
assurances of anonymity. Part of the information we wanted 
to collect in the states pertained to problems in program ad 
ministration, departures in administrative practice from 
policies prescribed in legislation or regulations, and prob 
lems with UI agency personnel, structure, or resources. 
Given the sensitivity of these issues and the relative ease with 
which the relevant agency respondents could be identified 
from even a generic description of their roles, we found it 
necessary to guarantee that not only individual respondents 
but also the participating states remain unidentified hi this 
report. By necessity, the discussion of site selection in this 
chapter, and a discussion of the data collected and the con 
clusions reached hi later chapters, must be kept somewhat 
less specific than would otherwise be the case. Despite this 
limitation, we have attempted to be as clear as possible about 
how site selection fits in with the research design, and about 
the effects of state level policies and implementation deci 
sions on important program outcomes.
Site Selection Criteria and Site Recommendations
The first criterion used to select states was the extent to 
which actual nonmonetary denial rates differed from rates
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predicted by the regression model described in the previous 
chapter. 1 Since the purpose of the process analysis was to at 
tempt to explain the state-to-state variation in denial rates 
that was left unexplained in the regression analysis, we chose 
to focus the process analysis on states hi which actual denial 
rates diverged considerably from what the regression model 
predicted. To implement this criterion, we first calculated 
the regression-based predictions for each of the four denial 
rate dependent variables for all states in 1981, the last year 
for which we then had state performance data. These predic 
tions are based on the regression coefficients estimated for 
the full 1964-1981 period (see Section D of chapter 2) and on 
state program characteristics and external economic 
variables for 1981. We then calculated the difference be 
tween the actual denial rate hi 1981 (of each type for each 
state) and the predicted rate. For each of the denial rate 
variables, states were then ranked according to the size of 
these differences, from the most positive difference (i.e., in 
which the actual rate exceeded the predicted rate by the 
greatest amount) to the most negative difference (i.e., in 
which the predicted rate exceeded the actual rate by the 
greatest amount). The states that were considered for selec 
tion fell within the top or bottom quarters of this rank order 
ing for any of the dependent variables, with preference given 
to states that fell more consistently within the top or bottom 
quarters across all four denial categories.
To arrive at an initial list of states, we applied an addi 
tional set of criteria. First, we verified the robustness of the 
ranking of states for each type of denial rate by deriving 
alternative rankings based on (1) differences between actual 
and predicted values for the entire 1964-1981 period and 
(2) the actual 1981 denial rates. Second, to ensure some 
geographic diversity, we attempted to use DOL region as a 
stratifying factor. Third, we considered a number of factors 
that might have indicated whether some states were exper-
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fencing extraordinary pressures on the UI system of quite 
different magnitudes than experienced by most other states 
and, hence, should have been excluded from the sample. 
Such factors included the local and state economic climate, 
the UI claim load, and the rate of increase in claims filed 
over the past several years. Fourth, we examined the basic 
experience rating criteria used by the states with respect to 
firms, so as not to include states that had very unusual prac 
tices. Finally, we placed some priority on including states 
with a wide range of denial rates from high to low and a 
variety of legislative provisions ranging from what could 
loosely be termed "liberal" (less demanding on claimants) to 
"stringent" (more demanding requirements and penalties 
for claimants).
After reviewing these selection criteria, we selected 20 
states for further consideration. These could be characteriz 
ed as having large positive or negative differences between 
predicted and actual denial rates for both types of separation 
issues (quits and misconducts) and for both types of 
nonseparation issues (able/available and refusal of suitable 
work). For each state, large positive differences occurred for 
separation and nonseparation issues, large negative dif 
ferences occurred for each, or a combination of both large 
positive and negative differences occurred. In addition, we 
attempted to pair states that had roughly opposite denial rate 
patterns, but that were reasonably similar otherwise.
Revision of Recommended Site List 
and Characteristics of Selected States
Officials in the Department of Labor reviewed the initial 
list of states, and the list was subsequently revised. Some 
states on the original list were deleted because, for instance, 
they (1) were too small and were thus unrepresentative of the 
typical state experience, (2) had a unique legal provision con-
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cerning work-search activity, (3) used a method for counting 
separation-related denials that differed from the method 
used hi most other states (which would pose difficulties hi 
cross-state comparisons), or (4) had recently amended then- 
laws governing key nonmonetary eligibility procedures. 
After these deletions, five states were added to the 
list—states that had been excluded from the initial list 
because they were hi geographic areas already represented. 
The final list contained twelve states—six designated as 
primary sampling states on the basis of our criteria, and six 
designated as a back-up sample. Half of each sample con 
sisted of states that showed generally large positive dif 
ferences between actual and predicted denial rates, and half 
consisted of states that showed generally large negative dif 
ferences.
The final step in selecting states was to gain then: coopera 
tion. Three of the six primary sample states agreed to 
cooperate in the study, as did three of the four secondary 
sample states that were contacted. Thus, 60 percent of the 
states which were contacted agreed to cooperate, with 
refusals concentrated in states with generally low denial rates 
(three of the four). The problem of selection bias associated 
with the refusals raises some concern about the 
generalizability of conclusions reached hi the process 
analysis, and adds to cautions already voiced about our abili 
ty to generalize from the study findings.
Although the identity of the six states selected must remain 
confidential, it is possible to report some of then* 
characteristics. The states varied in terms of the divergence 
of actual denial rates from predicted denial rates. In two 
states, actual denials greatly exceeded the predicted rates for 
two types of denials; hi another state, a large positive dif 
ference existed for one type of denial, and a large negative 
difference existed for another. Two states exhibited large
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negative differences for two types of denials, and one state 
exhibited a large negative difference for one type of denial. 
Generally, those states in which actual denial rates greatly 
exceeded their predicted rates also ranked high among the 
states in actual denial rates, and states which exhibited large 
negative differences also ranged in the lowest quintiles for all 
four types of denial rates.
The selected states also represent a fair degree of 
geographic diversity. They include one western state, one 
southern state, two midwestern states, and two northeastern 
states.
Selection of Local Sites
In addition to collecting documents from and conducting 
interviews with persons who are responsible for the UI 
system at the state level, the research design called for a 
similar effort in two local offices in each state—one in an ur 
ban area and one in a rural area. The local offices were 
selected in cooperation with state officials once a state's par 
ticipation in the study was assured. We sought local offices 
that exhibited a pattern of denials for nonmonetary eligibili 
ty issues that was similar to the pattern of the state as a 
whole. We attempted to screen out offices that, according to 
knowledgeable state officials, were exceptionally good or 
bad in areas pertaining to nonmonetary eligibility, or that 
were undergoing a transition in their operations or had 
unusual claims loads (e.g., a high proportion of interstate 
claims or seasonal layoffs).
B. Description of Research Data
The process analysis design called for collecting and using 
information on four broad sets of factors that, it was 
hypothesized, could affect the rates at which claimants were 
denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons: the regulatory
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definition of the UI program; the characteristics of the 
operational system which implements legislative and 
regulatory policy; the characteristics of the personnel who 
staff the UI agency; and the external economic and political 
factors which could affect agency and individual staff 
behavior.
Regulatory Context
The process analysis data collection focused primarily on 
the substance, importance, and use of UI regulations. First, 
the relationship between statutes and regulations can be im 
portant. In states with detailed, specific legislation, it might 
be expected that regulations would very closely reflect the 
apparent intent of the legislation. However, in other states 
where statutes provide an incomplete definition of the UI 
program, the substance of the regulations may suggest a 
policy direction that in some respects appears to differ from 
the legislation, or may provide a clear policy direction which 
is absent in the law. An analysis of the net effect of legisla 
tion and regulations in defining the strictness of re 
quirements imposed on claimants and the severity of 
penalties for violating eligibility requirements represents an 
important step toward improving the distinctions among 
state programs that are incorporated in the regression 
analysis.
The importance and use of UI regulations were to be 
assessed on the basis of the process analysis data. An ex 
amination of the regulations themselves could reveal their 
volume and detail, and comparisons between the regulations 
and statutes could indicate the extent to which policy defini 
tions are arrived at hi regulatory language and through the 
underlying agency decision process, as opposed to the 
legislative process. The specificity and detail of the regula 
tions were also of interest since they determine the extent to
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which the regulatory definition can be used as a basis for 
controlling the consistency with which the policy is im 
plemented. States with very specific and detailed regulations 
could rely on them as procedural guidelines and use them as 
training materials, thereby promoting uniform policy im 
plementation. States with very brief or general regulations 
could be expected to rely more heavily on interpretive 
memoranda or bureaucratic rules of thumb and tradition to 
define and enforce policy at the local level.
Characteristics of the Operational System
With any given policy on nonmonetary eligibility, it can be 
expected that the ability of a UI agency to implement the 
policy and enforce associated rules can affect observed 
denial rates. A variety of agency characteristics were thus in 
cluded hi the data collection plan. First, we wanted to ex 
amine the formal organizational structure under which the 
UI program operates, including such factors as the links be 
tween UI and employment service staffs, the nature of state 
and local coordination, methods for conveying policy infor 
mation and interpretations from policy staff to line staff and 
for monitoring performance, and the manner in which the 
organizational structure might contribute to or detract from 
managerial control in general. Also of interest were the pro 
cedures used at the local level to carry out the functions by 
which nonmonetary eligibility policy is executed: how deter 
mination issues and potential issues are detected, how infor 
mation on claimant behavior is reviewed and assessed, and 
how information on questionable situations is used to 
prompt a later examination and possible definition of deter 
mination issues. These procedures define the roles and 
responsibilities not only of claimants and employers but also 
of the agency. Together, the organizational structure and 
local office procedures define the processes of detection, 
fact-finding, and determination which constitute the essen 
tial components of enforcement.
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Personnel
The characteristics of agency staff involved in applying UI 
policy were also included in the process analysis data collec 
tion plan because of then* possible impact on the 
thoroughness and consistency with which UI policy is im 
plemented. Fkst, we were interested in the preparation of 
line staff for their jobs: the educational level of claim inter 
viewers and adjudicators, experience in a specific job or in a 
variety of relevant jobs they might have held, and the type 
and amount of job-specific training they received. We were 
also interested hi any information that might indicate the at 
titudes of staff towards the policy guidelines that they were 
asked to adhere to, as a possible measure of underlying sup 
port for policy goals* Finally, we were interested in indica 
tions of the consistency or inconsistency with which line staff 
understood and interpreted the policies they applied.
External Factors
Although the regression analysis included certain variables 
that describe each state's economy and the demographic 
characteristics of the unemployed population, we also focus 
ed some attention in the process analysis data collection on 
the external political and economic factors which might 
enhance our understanding of the development and applica 
tion of a state's nonmonetary eligibility policies. No 
systematic attempt was made to collect quantitative data, but 
efforts were made in site interviews to obtain respondents' 
interpretations of the manner in which external factors might 
be affecting their agency's operations. Of particular interest 
were such factors as the unemployment rate at the state and 
local levels, the industrial composition of the economy and 
the significance of employment patterns, the types of job 
skills and experience found among the claimant population, 
and the possible impact of political pressure groups (e.g., 
unions or chambers of commerce) on state policy and its ap 
plication.
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Process Analysis Data Priorities
The order in which these categories of process data have 
been presented also represents in general terms the relative 
priorities assigned to them in this study. These priorities 
reflect the importance and usefulness of each of the broad 
topics in refining the information represented by the 
program-related variables in the regression analysis. Details 
on UI regulations and the procedures and organizational 
methods used to implement them enhance the regression 
variables most directly. Conversely, staff characteristics and 
external factors may pertain only indirectly to the program 
variables in the regression analysis, to the extent that they 
may also have some effect on administrative effectiveness or 
on the demands placed on the UI system.
The priorities also reflect a judgment about what types of 
information are most appropriately collected in extensive site 
interviews, and they represent the best use of the limited 
resources available for the process analysis component of the 
study. In general, we focused primarily on obtaining 
respondents' interpretations of policies and procedures, 
rather than on obtaining precise objective data which are 
best collected by other means. For instance, we devoted little 
attention to collecting systematic data on the educational 
levels or experience of staff, objective data which described 
agency rates of determinations, denials, appeals, or other 
processes, or demographic statistics. To the extent that pro 
ject resources allowed us to collect such data, they were col 
lected for the regression analysis and incorporated in that 
part of the project.
C. Data Collection Methods
Data were collected from three sources in each of the six 
sites: relevant policy and procedural documents; agency per 
sonnel; and UI claimants.
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A critical first step in each site study was to conduct a 
detailed examination of state statutes, regulations, and 
documents that described agency operations, including 
handbooks, organizational charts, and public information 
brochures. Statutes and regulations were obtained before the 
site visits whenever possible, so that project staff could 
develop their understanding of the basic policy framework 
and identify issues that would be emphasized in site inter 
views.
The most extensive data collection effort was a series of in 
terviews conducted with agency officials and staff in each 
site. Variations hi program roles created some differences 
across states in the number of interviews and the titles of 
respondents. However, our general objective in all states was 
to interview individuals at the state level who were familiar 
with state UI laws and regulations and with overall state pro 
gram management. At the local level, we wanted to interview 
respondents who were familiar with the operational inter 
pretation of state policy, the details of the adjudication pro 
cess, local coordination between UI and employment service 
staff, and the intake and claims processes.
Site visits were conducted between May and September 
1983, and each lasted approximately four days. Site visits 
typically included interviews with three or four state office 
respondents over the course of two days. The state-level 
respondents included individuals who are responsible for the 
overall management of the UI benefits and employment ser 
vice units, the supervision of the adjudication process, and 
the supervision of local office operations. Local office inter 
views typically required one full day at each of the two of 
fices selected in each state. In the local offices, our primary 
objective was to conduct interviews with individuals who 
were knowledgeable about the nonmonetary determination 
process, employment service operations, and general UI
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claims processing. The selection of respondents depended 
largely on the complexity of the supervisory structure in the 
local office. In larger offices, our primary respondents were 
the chief of the adjudications staff and the employment ser 
vice manager. In smaller offices, we interviewed the office 
director if that person had a detailed knowledge of the deter 
mination process. In all of the local offices, we also inter 
viewed other staff who were particularly knowledgeable 
about aspects of the determination process or claims process 
ing.
In addition to the information obtained from local office 
staff, Mathematica Policy Research project staff examined a 
small sample of case records which described nonmonetary 
determinations in the previous year. This examination im 
proved our understanding of how decisions are documented 
and how closely individual decisions reflect the policies and 
procedures described by program documents and agency 
staff.
A third source of data for the process analysis was a small 
set of interviews conducted with UI claimants who had gone 
through a nonmonetary determination in the previous year. 
However, this data collection effort contributed very little to 
the process analysis. The design of the project called for con 
ducting about 10 claimant interviews by telephone in each 
state, a sample size that clearly could not provide any 
assurance that the responses would be representative of the 
general population of claimants who had experienced deter 
minations. Nevertheless, it seemed that such interviews 
might yield some insights which would help us interpret 
other information obtained for the process analysis. In the 
end, however, the interviews were of limited value for a 
number of reasons. First, the limited resources available for 
claimant data collection precluded a very extensive effort. 
Since the address information of sample members was quite 
old, the search for current telephone numbers proved dif-
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ficult. A significant portion of the rural sample in some 
states had no telephone service. In the end, we completed 
fewer interviews than even the small number we had hoped 
to complete. Moreover, the specific events we asked the 
respondents to comment on (i.e., a specific determination 
and/or appeal) had in some cases occurred so far in the past 
that the respondents could not provide the detailed informa 
tion we had hoped for. If information from claimants were 
intended to serve as a central data source of a study, it is 
clear that a much larger and more timely data collection ef 
fort would be necessary.
D. Strengths and Limitations
with the Process Analysis Methodology
The process analysis approach has proved to be extremely 
valuable in enhancing our understanding of the factors that 
contribute to variations hi nonmonetary denial rates. The 
methodology described in this chapter allowed project staff 
to cover a wide range of potentially interesting and impor 
tant information, placing emphasis in each site on those fac 
tors that seemed most relevant to outcome patterns.
Along with these advantages, of course, are certain limita 
tions imposed by the methodology itself. The intensive effort 
required in each site limited our study to six states. Reliable 
patterns of relationships between regulatory and ad 
ministrative factors and denial rates are therefore difficult to 
establish. In fact, the relationship between cause and effect is 
likely to be peculiar to each state. We can hope to identify a 
variety of program features that seem to affect outcomes, 
but not to confirm the impact of particular features across 
states.
Another problem encountered in applying this 
methodology is that, although a wealth of information can 
be gathered, only some of it can be organized in ways that
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will yield insights into the research issues of interest. We 
have found, for instance, that an examination of state 
regulations and the operational characteristics of state agen 
cies has contributed most to our understanding of deter 
mination outcomes, but that the information we obtained 
about external factors and staff characteristics was difficult 
to compare across states and to use as a basis for drawing 
any causal inferences.
The approach used to collect most of the site information 
(i.e., interviews with agency personnel) also has certain 
limitations. On certain topics, such as interpreting regula 
tions and defining procedures used in local offices, staff 
perceptions provide direct evidence on the types of variations 
in UI administration that might be expected to influence 
denial rates. However, the comments of staff about certain 
statistical patterns of claimant behavior or agency operations 
must be treated much more cautiously. Such comments do 
represent attempts to provide objective quantitative data and 
can prompt the investigation of available statistical data, but 
without verification they cannot be used as valid evidence for 
the process analysis. Thus, given the lack of resources for 
detailed agency studies, our analysis placed less emphasis on 
certain impressions or speculations offered by respondents.
The requirement that we preserve the anonymity of the 
participating states has also imposed something of a limita 
tion on the study. Data must be presented with some inten 
tional reduction in their specificity.
Despite these limitations, the process analysis has helped 
us establish some clear patterns of variation among the states 
and to identify the ways in which these variations affect 
denial rates. Chapter 4 describes the determination process 
and the range of variation observed in the major aspects of 
that process. Chapter 5 then presents our interpretations of 
the relationships between the characteristics of the deter 
mination process and denial rates.
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NOTE
1. The coefficients of the state binary variables in the regression models 





A three-step process leads to the denial of UI benefits for 
nonmonetary reasons. In the first step, the agency defines 
and imposes the nonmonetary eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of benefits; these requirements define the difference 
between claimants who should be considered eligible if they 
file for benefits and those who should be denied benefits. In 
the second step, the agency identifies potential determination 
issues. To carry out this step, the UI agency must follow pro 
cedures to detect situations that must be investigated and ad 
judicated. In the third step, the agency assembles informa 
tion on identified determination issues, considers the facts, 
and formulates a determination decision. The cumulative ef 
fect of these three steps determines the observed rates of 
nonmonetary denials.
To understand the variations hi denial rates across states, 
we must examine each of these stages in the determination 
process individually. At one stage, a state may appear to 
pose stringent requirements for claimants, yet, at another 
stage, its rules or procedures may be quite tolerant of a wide 
range of claimant situations and behavior. The six states 
chosen for the process analysis clearly illustrate the impor 
tance of determination rates as factors in overall denial rates, 
as well as their variability. Table 4.1 presents the national 
quintile ranking of the six states for the frequency of deter 
minations and the overall denial rate. 1 As pointed out in 
chapter 2, even in states that exhibit very high rates of 
denials as a percentage of determinations, it is the determina 
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claimant contacts—which most clearly determines the 
overall denial rate. The six states are numbered 1 to 6 in ap 
proximately the order of their overall denial rates. Behind 
this simple ranking are different patterns of determination 
and denial rates. State 3, for instance, ranks relatively low in 
the rate at which determination issues are identified, but very 
high in the rate at which identified issues lead to denial. State 
1 ranks rather high hi identifying determination issues, but 
quite low in the rate at which they become denials. State 4 
ranks generally low in identifying determination issues, but 
displays quite divergent rates for denials, ranking very high 
for the voluntary quit and able/available reasons, but very 
low for the misconduct and job refusal reasons. Explaining 
these different patterns is an important objective of the pro 
cess analysis.
This chapter provides a foundation for explaining these 
varied patterns of determination and denial rates by compar 
ing the ways in which the three stages of the determination 
process are accomplished in the sample states. Section A ex 
amines the effective nonmonetary eligibility requirements in 
each state, based on the provisions of legislation, regula 
tions, and operational rules. Section B describes the varia 
tion in methods used by the states to detect determination 
issues, and Section C discusses the information we obtained 
on the fact-finding and determination decisionmaking pro 
cess itself. These three sections provide some basis for 
delineating what the states do in each of the three steps of 
nonmonetary determination. In the site visits, we also ex 
plored a range of agency characteristics that might help ex 
plain why they do those things. Section D discusses these fac 
tors and the information we gathered which appear to 
distinguish one state from another.
This chapter focuses primarily on the differences among 
the states in terms of eligibility requirements and their
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methods to detect determination issues. It is along these two 
dimensions that we were able to construct the clearest and 
most complete comparison of the six states, and along which 
differences among them emerged most clearly in the 
analysis. We focus less on the fact-finding and decisionmak- 
ing process, as well as on agency characteristics that might 
affect the overall determination process. On these topics, in 
formation derived from the site visits was less indicative of 
clear patterns. Although certain characteristics and problems 
described by respondents are worth noting, we generally 
found that the information was less helpful in explaining the 
pattern of determination and denial rates.
A. Eligibility Requirements
In the site visits, Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) 
staff examined statutory and regulatory language and ob 
tained summaries and interpretations of eligibility re 
quirements from interview respondents. Thus, the eligibility 
requirements described in this section are the "effective 
rules"—the rules as they are applied in practice.
In presenting state characteristics in this chapter, we make 
no attempt to convey an overall impression of each state's UI 
program or to interpret how program characteristics affect 
denial rates. Instead, we simply portray the range of ap 
proaches followed for specific aspects of the nonmonetary 
determination process. Chapter 5 will reassemble this detail 
ed information in summary descriptions of each state, in an 
attempt to point out the ways in which the program rules and 
operations in each state lead to its pattern of denial rates, 
and to draw general conclusions from a broad review of all 
six states.
Separation Issues
Rules regarding separation issues are intended to define 
the circumstances under which claimants are to be con-
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sidered responsible for their own unemployment, and the ex 
tent to which they should be penalized for the actions which 
led to then* unemployment. The rules in all states distinguish 
between situations in which the claimant voluntarily leaves a 
job and situations in which the claimant is discharged from 
work. They represent an attempt to define the circumstances 
under which claimants who quit did so "without good 
cause" and whether they were discharged for misconduct. 
Both quitting without good cause and being discharged for 
misconduct are grounds for benefit denial.
Voluntary Quit. All six states have eligibility requirements 
which allow claimants to receive benefits after quitting a job 
if they can demonstrate that their departure was prompted 
by the actions or behavior of the employer. Although the 
level of regulatory detail and the language used to describe 
employment-related reasons vary, the six states seem to 
define a common set of employer actions that are acceptable 
reasons for quitting—such reasons as an employer's breach 
of an employment contract, verbal or sexual abuse or harass 
ment, mandatory retirement, violation of health or safety 
standards, employer changes in wages or work conditions to 
levels generally unacceptable in the occupation, and various 
infringements on an employee's labor rights.
However, the states do vary in the extent to which per 
sonal reasons for leaving a job are considered "good cause" 
for quitting. States 1,2, and 5 use the most liberal definition 
of valid personal reasons. These states define "compelling 
personal reasons" which would justify a voluntary quit, in 
cluding such reasons as excessive commuting distance, hav 
ing to care for a household member who is ill, pregnancy, 
avoiding a transfer out of the area, and having to accompany 
a spouse whose job requires moving. State 6 defines other ac 
ceptable personal reasons, including a desire to avoid 
"bumping" fellow workers in a layoff situation, health 
reasons, accepting other employment, and shortened hours
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of work over a two-week period. Among these states, it 
should be noted that the regulations in States 1 and 2 provide 
extremely detailed definitions of the circumstances that 
should or should not be considered good cause. The level of 
specificity in the regulations might be expected to limit the 
staff discretion that can be exercised in identifying issues and 
making determination decisions.
States 3 and 4 define allowable cause for voluntary quit 
more restrictively. State 4 allows no personal reasons at all; 
only reasons that are "attributable to the employer" can 
justify a voluntary quit and lead to the award of benefits. 
The rules of State 3 are also restrictive, in that they call for 
the denial of benefits unless the voluntary quit is for "good 
cause attributable to the employer." State 3, however, 
stipulates that "valid personal circumstances" for a quit, if 
demonstrated, can justify a milder penalty.
This description of state rules on acceptable reasons for 
voluntary quits illustrates how the detailed examination con 
ducted for the process analysis improves upon the data in 
corporated in the regression analysis. Based on a simple 
classification of state statutes, States 1,2,4, and 6 would be 
considered states that restrict the definition of good cause to 
reasons connected with the work or attributable to the 
employer; States 3 and 5 would be considered states that do 
not. However, based on the details of state regulations and 
practices, we found that States 1, 2, and 6 also allow 
claimants to be awarded benefits on the basis of personal 
reasons that do not pertain to problems with either the work 
itself or the employer.
Misconduct. In all of the sample states, claimants are 
awarded benefits if they are laid off by the employer because 
of a lack of work or are terminated for poor performance. 
However, if the employer discharges an employee because of 
misconduct, the claimant will be considered responsible for
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the loss of the job and will be denied benefits. Although the 
states vary hi their language on misconduct, several themes 
consistently emerge. The employer must demonstrate several 
facts about the employee's behavior and about the 
employer's response which led to the discharge. The 
employer must show that the employee's action or behavior 
indicated a deliberate or negligent disregard for the 
employer's interests, and that the behavior had an adverse 
effect on the employer. The employer must also show that 
the employee was aware of the employer's policies when they 
were violated, or could reasonably have been expected to be 
conscious of them. Finally, the employer must demonstrate 
that it reasonably and consistently applied the rules whose 
violation led to the discharge, gave the employee some warn 
ing before the discharge, and made an effort to resolve the 
problem with the employee before the discharge.
However, in two respects, certain states can be distinguish 
ed from the others in their definition of misconduct. The 
first is whether the state uses a single definition of miscon 
duct, or distinguishes between different degrees of miscon 
duct. States 1,4, 5, and 6 use a simple definition of miscon 
duct and apply a uniform penalty for all cases of miscon 
duct. State 3, however, has defined two levels of misconduct. 
"Gross misconduct" consists of illegal acts against the 
employer, a series of work rule violations, or actions that in 
dicate malice towards the employer. "Misconduct connected 
with work" is a vaguer but definitely broader definition of 
actions by the employee that do not necessarily constitute 
either (1) the clear intent or disregard associated with most 
state definitions of misconduct or (2) a demonstration of the 
employer's efforts to resolve the problem. In fact, interview 
respondents in State 3 suggested that any discharge that was 
not caused by lack of work, but which was based on a viola 
tion of work-site rules, would normally be classified as 
misconduct connected with work. State 2 also defines two
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levels of misconduct. "Normal misconduct" resembles the 
definition of misconduct used by most states, but "gross 
misconduct" consists of an action by the employee which 
would constitute an indictable offense and of which the 
employee has been proved guilty either by written admission 
or by conviction.
A second, more subtle variation in misconduct definitions 
is the degree to which the states establish misconduct on the 
basis of the employee's failure to work up to standards set by 
the employer or to comply with job requirements. The rules 
of all the states are clearly designed to prevent assigning the 
misconduct definition to an employee if that person is simply 
unable to measure up to the demands of the job. However, 
State 1 is noteworthy in that it imposes a slightly more 
demanding standard for employees. It need not be 
demonstrated that the employee deliberately wronged an 
employer. An employee's actions can be considered to repre 
sent misconduct if they show an indifference to or a neglect 
of duties established by the "employer contract," as oppos 
ed to a more abstract definition of the employer's interests 
from the state's perspective. Moreover, a claimant can be 
discharged for misconduct if his or her present performance 
does not match past productivity and thus indicates current 
negligence or indifference. Although formal policies in other 
states refer to such employee behavior, State 1 was the only 
one we visited which seems to deny benefits on such grounds.
Penalties for Separation Issues. In all states, claimants 
who have been discharged for misconduct or who quit are 
denied benefits, but the penalties associated with the denials 
vary. In general, the states use the following separation 
denial penalties:
• Disqualification for Duration of Unemployment. If this 
provision is included in the penalty, disqualified 
claimants would not be eligible for UI benefits until they
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become re-employed and subsequently lose then* 
employment for valid reasons.
• Disqualification for Defined Period. If claimants are 
not disqualified for the duration of unemployment, they 
are disqualified for a specified period, but need not 
become re-employed and subsequently unemployed 
before receiving benefits.
• Minimum Standards for Re-employment. When a 
claimant is disqualified for the duration of unemploy 
ment, it is expected that a substantial period of new 
employment elapse before a subsequent claim is filed. 
Some states define this period in terms of the amount of 
money that must be earned in the new employment, 
either as an explicit minimum dollar amount or as a 
multiple of the weekly benefit amount which the claim 
ant would receive if eligible. Other states define the 
period in terms of the length of time employed.
• Loss of Wage Credits. Disqualification for the duration 
of unemployment delays a claimant's ability to draw 
upon wage credits. Benefits based on wage credits are 
lost only if because of the delay before requalification a 
claimant reaches the end of the benefit year before ex 
hausting benefits from the base period. However, some 
states impose penalties which also provide for the loss of 
wage credits.
The severity of a state's penalties depends to some extent 
on the circumstances of individual claimants. The employ 
ment history, wage level, and weekly benefit amount of each 
claimant would determine whether the claimant would find it 
more difficult to requalify for benefits in new employment 
under a requirement stated in dollar terms or as a multiple of 
the weekly benefit amount. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
provide some rough categorization of the six sample states in 
terms of the severity of penalties. States 1 and 5 could be
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viewed as having the mildest penalties, disqualifying 
claimants on separation issues only for the duration of 
unemployment and until they have earned, respectively, five 
and six times the weekly benefit amount. State 3 imposes 
somewhat more severe penalties. Claimants must earn 10 
times then- weekly benefit amount hi new employment if they 
have quit employment without good cause or have been 
discharged for gross misconduct. However, a reduced penal 
ty is defined for "voluntary quits with valid circumstances" 
and for "misconduct connected with work." In such cases, 
claimants are disqualified for an elapsed period of 5 to 16 
weeks, with the exact period determined individually (and 
apparently somewhat objectively) for each case. In such 
cases, no re-employment requirement is established. 
Penalties hi State 2 are still more severe, since all disqualified 
claimants must earn 10 times their weekly benefit amount in 
new employment before requalifying.
States 4 and 6 could be viewed as imposing the most severe 
penalties for separation denials. They require both minimum 
earnings and a minimum period of time in new employment 
for requalification. State 4 requires claimants to work for 
five weeks and to earn 10 times their weekly benefit amount 
for requaliflcation. State 6 requires claimants to work for 
four weeks and to earn a minimum of $200 in order to be re- 
qualified after having been denied benefits for voluntary 
quits. Claimants who are denied benefits because of miscon 
duct in State 6 are disqualified for three weeks, but also lose 
all wage credits accrued from the employer who discharged 
them, a provision which could be very severe for an 
employee whose base-period wage credits came entirely or 
primarily from that employer.
Nonseparation Issues
Unemployment insurance claimants can be denied benefits 
for two reasons not pertaining to the circumstances sur-
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rounding their termination from their last employment: 
(1) if they are unable to or unavailable for work, or (2) if 
they refuse a job offer or a referral to a potential employer 
without an acceptable reason. For "able and available" 
issues, benefits will be denied for any week in which the 
claimant is considered to be unable to or unavailable for 
work. Penalties for refusal resemble those imposed for 
separation issues.
Able and Available. To be eligible for UI benefits in any 
state, the claimant must be able to work from the standpoint 
of physical and mental health, and must be available for and 
ready to accept work. Claimants must also demonstrate a 
real connection to the job market to support the claim that 
they are able and available for suitable work; most states re 
quire evidence of job search to indicate such exposure to the 
job market.
State rules on "able and available" requirements vary 
along several dimensions, however. First, states differ in 
how they define the types of work that claimants must be 
able to perform to be considered "able." Second, states dif 
fer in the latitude they allow claimants in deciding what con 
stitutes "suitable" work and how this latitude changes as the 
spell of unemployment continues. Third, the states set dif 
ferent standards about what portion of a week a claimant 
may be unavailable for work and still not be denied benefits 
for that week. Finally, they differ in how they define the 
work-search activity in which claimants must engage to re 
main eligible.
To varying degrees, the rules of all six of the sample states 
acknowledge that health problems which interfere with work 
in the claimant's usual occupation do not necessarily imply 
that the claimant is unable to work. States 2 and 5, for in 
stance, require simply that the claimant be able to perform 
some gainful work that exists in the job market. State 1 re-
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quires that the claimant be able to perform any type of work 
for which he or she would be reasonably suited by virtue of 
experience and skills, but it clearly does not require the abili 
ty to work in the claimant's usual occupation. As an 
operating guideline, State 6 requires that claimants be in suf 
ficient health to perform 15 percent of the jobs in the 
market, although how such a refined standard is applied is 
unclear. No information on the definition of ability to work 
was obtained for State 4, which may simply reflect the 
absence of a precise rule.
State 3 uses the most liberal definition of ability to work. 
If claimants who receive benefits become sick or disabled 
and are unable to work, they are allowed to continue to 
receive benefits until they are offered employment or a job 
referral. When they report an illness or disability, the agency 
first determines whether a job match can be made through 
the employment service. If a suitable job is available, the 
claimant must either accept it or be deemed unable to work 
and be denied continuing benefits until the health problem is 
corrected. If no job match is made, claimants can continue 
to receive benefits.
All of the sample states allow claimants to be available on 
ly for "suitable" work. However, this policy is commonly 
defined only in the regulations, and not in the statutes. Based 
on the statutes, only State 5 among the sample states would 
be counted as allowing this restriction; all others were treated 
in the regression analysis as using a policy that did not give 
claimants the option of restricting themselves to "suitable" 
work.
State definitions of "suitability" deal most commonly 
with jobs that claimants could reasonably expect to obtain, 
or which would not impose intolerable burdens on them. For 
instance, if a claimant has no qualifications for or experience 
with a particular type of work, the states generally do not re-
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quire that the person be available for that type of work, or 
view the claimant's stated availability for such work as hav 
ing satisfied availability requirements. States allow claimants 
to restrict their availability to employment that does not pose 
health or safety hazards, and which is located within an ac 
ceptable distance from their residence. However, large dif 
ferences exist within the six sample states in terms of the 
detail and precision with which these rules are developed. 
States 1 and 2, hi this area as in others, provide a clearly 
greater level of definition than other states.
It appears that all of the six states allow claimants to 
restrict then* availability to work that pays wages and re 
quires skills comparable to then* usual occupation, but it also 
appears that the states relax this restriction as the claimant's 
unemployment continues. The clarity and terms of this 
policy vary significantly among the six states. Statutes or 
regulations hi States 3 and 5 do not define how claimants are 
expected to lower their expectations about wages as time 
elapses. State 4 simply allows claimants a "reasonable tune" 
before they are expected to adjust the scope of their 
availability. States 1 and 6 define specific "adjustment 
periods" during which claimants may restrict themselves to 
jobs at their usual pay—for example, State 6 for six weeks 
and State 1 for a period of between four and ten weeks, 
depending on the skill level of the claimant's occupation. 
However, neither of these states clearly defines how rapidly 
claimants are then expected to adjust their wage demands 
and by how much. In State 2, however, explicit guidelines on 
this subject are included in the regulations, allowing 
claimants the first five weeks to search for comparably pay 
ing jobs, with three subsequent six-week periods in which 
their wage demands should be reduced to, respectively, 75, 
70, and 65 percent of their last pay.
The extent to which claimants may limit the hours and 
shifts they are willing to work without being considered
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unavailable for work varies somewhat from state to state. 
Despite differences in description, however, States 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 all basically require claimants to be available to work 
the hours which are customary for the occupation in ques 
tion. Typically, claimants may exclude night-time hours 
unless those are the rule in their occupation, and may limit 
themselves to night-time hours only if a substantial labor 
market remains open to them with that restriction. State 6 
simply requires that, whatever the restrictions claimants 
place on hours, they must remain available for 50 percent of 
the jobs in the occupations in which they are seeking work. 
State 4 appears to have no clearly defined rules on hours 
restrictions.
All of the sample states deny benefits for any week hi 
which a UI claimant is unavailable for work. Claimants may 
be considered unavailable if they are away on vacation, at 
tempting to become self-employed, incarcerated, too ill to 
work, or otherwise not in a position to accept employment. 
It appears to be common practice, and in some instances part 
of eligibility regulations, to accept a claimant's unavailabili 
ty for part of a week without denying benefits. The states 
vary somewhat in how strictly they apply their rules on 
partial-week availability. The regulations in State 1 clearly 
stipulate that benefits will be denied for the entire week if a 
claimant is unavailable for work for more than one day in a 
week. States 2 and 5 are less demanding; they simply require 
that the claimant be available for work for the "majority of 
the week," so that two days of unavailability would be ac 
cepted. States 3,4, and 6 have no clear rules on partial-week 
availability that we could discover.
To be considered unemployed, an individual must be seek 
ing work. All of the states express this requirement with two 
rules: claimants must register with the state employment ser 
vice, and they must pursue and provide evidence of their own 
active work search. For both requirements, the six sample
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states differ considerably hi how stringently they apply them 
to claimants.
All six of the sample states require some form of registra 
tion with the employment service; but, to varying degrees, 
they all recognize that it would be inappropriate to require 
all claimants to register. One aim common to all of the states 
is to avoid burdening the employment service with register 
ing claimants who have been temporarily laid off and who 
either expect to be recalled within a reasonably short tune or 
will be recalled on a definite date. Not extending registration 
requirements to such claimants is also in the interests of 
employers which are responsible for the layoffs, because it 
effectively prevents the employment service from referring 
these claimants to other jobs, and thus protects the 
employers' pools of experienced workers available for recall. 
The states also commonly exempt from registration re 
quirements those claimants who normally find work through 
a union-hiring process or who are unemployed because of a 
labor dispute in which they are not directly participating.
However, the sample states vary widely in how long an an 
ticipated period of layoff will be accepted without imposing 
the registration requirement, and how long a period may go 
by before excused claimants are required to register. States 1, 
2,4, and 6 are relatively stringent on this matter, exempting 
claimants from registration if then* unemployment is ex 
pected to last up to four or five weeks. States 3 and 5, 
however, allow much longer anticipated unemployment (10 
and 13 weeks, respectively) before requiring registration.
The substance of the registration process that satisfies 
eligibility requirements in the states also varies, and seems to 
reflect the level of expectation in the state agency about the 
degree to which the employment service will in fact expose 
claimants to potential job offers. At one extreme, State 5 
simply requires claimants to sign a statement about their
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willingness to accept employment. State 3 requires a minimal 
registration process: the majority of unattached claimants2 
need only complete a short registration form that is subse 
quently entered on employment service files as an "inactive" 
registration, so that the claimant is subject to referral only 
when voluntary registrants with the employment service do 
not provide enough suitable referrals to employers who re 
quest them. UI claimants are placed in "active" registration 
(which exposes them to the real likelihood of job match) only 
if they are hi high-demand occupations or if the local 
economy is active enough to require expanding the pool of 
available referrals. Although State 6 requires all claimants to 
register if they do not expect to be recalled within five weeks, 
it maintains a special "short-term" file with the registration 
information of all claimants who expect to be recalled within 
five months. The employment service will match these 
claimants only with jobs of a specified short duration, 
which, according to agency respondents, substantially 
reduces the likelihood of a job match and referral. The rules 
in States 1,2, and 4 constitute the most substantive registra 
tion process: claimants are required both to complete forms 
that provide information on work skills and availability and 
to take an interview with an employment service 
interviewer. 3
No state agency explicitly assumes that all UI claimants 
will become re-employed through the efforts of the employ 
ment service, but the six states we examined vary dramatical 
ly in the extent to which their eligibility requirements insist 
upon an active, independent work search by the claimant. 
The states also vary in terms of the regularity with which and 
the methods whereby they expect claimants to seek jobs, and 
the evidence they expect to document that search. The most 
routinized job-search documentation is expected in States 3 
and 4, where claimants are to conduct an active job search 
and submit the names of two employer contacts made each
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week when they file ongoing claims. In State 4, the contacts 
are supposed to be made on two different days of the week.
States 1 and 2 have regulations and practices which define 
a more flexible requirement. In State 1, claimants are re 
quired to be "actively seeking" work, to provide evidence of 
the previous two weeks of search activity at application time, 
and again to provide evidence of two weeks of search during 
Eligibility Review Process (ERP) interviews at ten-week in 
tervals. No standard number of contacts is expected each 
week, but, for each case, claims interviewers can determine 
what constitutes an appropriate level of search activity, 
depending on the type of work sought and the local job 
market. In State 2, statutes and regulations simply require a 
"diligent search" effort, which can be established for each 
individual case. In practice, however, State 2 appears to re 
quire that all claimants submit the names of two employer 
contacts per week.
States 5 and 6 have the least rigorous job-search re 
quirements. State 5 does not appear to have a rule that 
establishes an active work-search requirement, so that 
availability for work is likely to be tested only if a claimant is 
referred to a job interview by the employment service. State 
6 has no formal work-search requirement that applies as a 
blanket rule. The UI agency can impose a specific search ac 
tivity requirement for individual claimants if their labor 
market attachment is questionable; however, agency 
respondents report that this step is taken only for less than 1 
percent of all claimants.
Refusal of Work or Referral All states require claimants 
to accept referrals to suitable jobs when offered by the 
employment service, and to accept offers of suitable work 
from employers whether the offer is generated through an 
employment service referral or through an independent work 
search. The definition of suitable work is the major source of 
variation in refusal policy among the states.
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Definitions of suitability of work for purposes of deter 
mining whether a job is refused with good cause generally 
correspond to the suitability criteria used to assess claimants' 
availability for work. The clearest variation among the sam 
ple states exists in the rules on the extent to which and the 
speed with which claimants must adjust their job demands 
over time. As described earlier, State 2 has the most specific 
and stringent policy on this criterion. States 1 and 6 define 
specific periods after which some adjustment is necessary. 
States 3,4, and 5 have no clearly stated rules at all on the ad 
justment period.
States also seem to vary in the type of distinction they 
make between refusing to accept a job referral and failing to 
respond to agency attempts to provide the referral. Although 
benefit denial would normally be justified only by an explicit 
refusal by the claimant, an inadequate response to referral 
attempts sometimes indicates a situation in which the claim 
ant is not actually available for work. The manner in which 
states follow up on difficulties in making referrals is discuss 
ed below, when we examine the methods for detecting deter 
mination issues.
Penalties for refusing job offers or referrals generally cor 
respond to those imposed for misconduct and voluntary 
quits. States 1 and 5 disqualify claimants for the duration of 
employment and until their subsequent employment earnings 
equal, respectively, five and six times the weekly benefit 
amount. State 2 requires claimants to have post- 
unemployment earnings of 10 times the weekly benefit 
amount. State 3 disqualifies claimants either for five to ten 
weeks or until re-employment earnings reach 10 times the 
weekly benefit amount. Agency respondents in State 3 
reported that the penalty depends on "personal cir 
cumstances" and the "suitability of the job," but we did not 
discover any more explicit decision guidelines. States 4 and 6 
disqualify claimants for the duration of unemployment and
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require both a minimum period of re-employment and 
minimum earnings. State 4 requires five weeks of work and 
10 times the weekly benefit amount, and State 6 requires 
four weeks of work and at least $200 in gross earnings before 
a claimant can requalify.
B. Detection and Identification 
of Determination Issues
Eligibility requirements provide the theoretical basis for 
determining which claimants should be awarded or denied 
benefits. However, nonmonetary denials occur only when 
some reason has been established to question or challenge 
the legitimacy of a particular claimant's work separation or 
continuing availability and willingness to accept work. The 
effectiveness with which UI agencies identify issues that re 
quire determination can thus be expected to affect then* abili 
ty to deny benefits to claimants who are in fact ineligible. 
This section describes the ways in which the six sample states 
identify cases that require determination for both separation 
and nonseparation issues.
Separation Issues
The site visits uncovered two types of variation among the 
sample states which could contribute to differences in the 
rates at which separation-related determination issues are 
raised. The first pertains to the possible effect that informa 
tion provided to individuals during intake has on detecting 
determination issues. The second pertains to the manner in 
which the UI agencies solicit information on separation 
issues from employers and take the initiative themselves in 
opening the determination process.
The manner in which UI agencies provide information on 
program rules to individuals at intake seems to reflect two 
motives. On the one hand, the agencies we examined were 
simply complying with their legal obligation to provide
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claimants with information about their rights and respon 
sibilities under the unemployment insurance law. On the 
other hand, agency respondents consistently stressed that 
agency policy was to encourage application, and that the 
agency had no motivation and made no effort to screen out 
or to discourage the application of individuals who had 
potentially questionable claims. Clearly, however, informa 
tion provided to individuals who are interested in filing an 
initial claim might potentially either discourage them from 
applying or affect the information they supply to support 
their claim. In turn, either condition could affect the fre 
quency with which agencies identify questionable claims and 
perform determinations.
The UI agencies in the sample states did in fact vary ac 
cording to when and how they provided information on UI 
rules and claimants' responsibilities in the sequence of intake 
steps. States 1,3, and 5 seem to provide a brochure onrules, 
rights, and responsibilities only after the claimant has com 
pleted the application forms for UI, has provided informa 
tion on the reason for work separation and on his or her 
availability for employment, and has made some contact 
with the claims taker.4 In State 2, individuals receive a 
brochure on program eligibility rules and their respon 
sibilities before they provide any application information. 
When they are called in to see a claims taker, the claims taker 
briefly reviews the program rules and then reads through the 
questions on the initial claims form and fills it out for the 
claimants as they respond. In State 4, claimants receive an 
explanation of the program and their rights and respon 
sibilities after meeting with an employment service inter 
viewer, but before completing the initial claims form and 
talking with a claims taker. Furthermore, if the claims form 
indicates a possible separation issue, claimants are asked to 
return with a completed fact-finding form a week later when 
they file their first weekly claim. In States 2 and 4, it is possi-
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ble that some specific information on program rules might 
turn away individuals who doubt their own eligibility. This 
situation would be particularly possible in State 4, hi which 
the normal sequence of events would give the claimant a 
week to decide whether or not to go ahead with the claim. It 
should be stressed, however, that none of the agency 
respondents felt that a screening effect was occurring to any 
significant extent.
A stronger potential for influencing determination fre 
quencies lies hi the variation among state methods for ob 
taining information from employers on separation reasons 
and the extent to which the agency itself will initiate a deter 
mination. Since all states ask claimants for then* own state 
ment about why they were separated from employment, the 
agency itself has some basis for independently deciding 
whether an issue exists and requires determination. Some 
variation exists among the states in the extent to which they 
use this information, the manner hi which they pose ques 
tions to employers, and the degree to which the agency insists 
that employers return the form on which they are asked to 
provide information.
States 1,2, and 3 seem to take a more active role hi obtain 
ing employer information and in finding issues than do 
States 4, 5, and 6. Before awarding benefits, State 1 sends a 
form to the last employer and asks the employer to return the 
form with the information on the reason for separation. If 
the form is not returned, claims adjudicators will telephone 
the employer before the first claim is processed, even if 
repeated efforts are necessary. State 2 automatically initiates 
the determination process as soon as the claims interviewer 
notes an apparent issue on the initial claim form, and pro 
vides two separate mechanisms whereby employers can 
notify the agency about the separation circumstances. 
Employers are provided with a stock of forms which they
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can use at their own initiative to inform the agency when an 
employee is terminated, allowing them in a sense to submit a 
"prior protest" before the agency solicits information or 
even receives a claim from the claimant. In addition, the 
agency routinely sends a different form to the last employer 
of each new claimant to request separation information, and 
this form must be returned before the claim is processed. 
State 3 sends information request forms to all of the claim 
ant's employers in the four base-period quarters and the 
most recent quarter, and follows up the request forms with a 
telephone call to the most recent employer if no response is 
received by the first weekly claim filing.
States 4,5, and 6 follow procedures which in various ways 
seem less likely to uncover real issues or to lead to reported 
determinations. In State 4, for instance, a form that requests 
separation information is sent to the last employer and is to 
be returned within seven days; however, if no response is 
received, follow-up procedures are not undertaken, and the 
claim is then processed. The frequency of determinations in 
State 4 might also tend to be held down by the high percent 
age of initial claims that are filed by employers directly for 
temporarily laid-off workers (40 to 55 percent, according to 
respondents). Such claims are probably less likely to contain 
information that would be questioned by agency staff. State 
5 sends an information request form to the last employer and 
monitors the return of the form, but it treats identified issues 
in a way that may depress the reported number of determina 
tions. If an apparent issue is identified when the claimant 
completes the initial claims form, an interview is conducted 
immediately to collect further information. If this interview 
demonstrates that no reason for denial exists, the process is 
not counted as a determination.
State 6 specifically requires that separation issues be in 
itiated only by employers' protests on the forms the agency 
sends them. Claims interviewers note only nonseparation
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issues, and do not initiate a determination even if the claim 
ant reports having quit or been fired from the last job. 
Moreover, a form sent to employers asks whether they 
"question the eligibility of the claimant for benefits," and 
not simply the reason for the individual's job separation. For 
employers who are unfamiliar with unemployment insurance 
law and the experience rating system, or for employers who 
already pay the maximum tax rate, this approach for obtain 
ing information would seem less likely to elicit answers that 
might lead to benefit denial.
Nonseparation Issues
Continuing eligibility issues are most likely to be identified 
from four sources: (1) an examination of intake forms;
(2) an examination of ongoing claim forms for compliance 
with availability, refusal, and work-search requirements;
(3) information obtained in periodic Eligibility Review Pro 
cess (ERP) interviews; and (4) the responses of claimants to 
job referrals or offers generated by the employment service. 
The states vary in the strictness of their claims review pro 
cess, the frequency and regularity of ERP interviews, the 
likelihood that claimants will be exposed to job referrals, 
and the agency's treatment of claimants' responses to refer 
rals. We did not obtain noteworthy information on all of 
these ways to identify issues for all of the sample states, but a 
summary of relevant available information for each state 
shows some distinctions among them.
State 1 appears to use the claims review process and ERP 
interviews fairly rigorously. Weekly claims forms pose ques 
tions designed to flush out issues. Claimants are asked for a 
straightforward account of facts without any interpretation. 
For example, they are simply asked whether they refused any 
work, rather than whether they refused work without good 
cause. Similarly, they are asked whether they were available 
for work for the entire week, even though one day of
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unavailability would not represent a basis for denial. 
Claimants who are required to appear in person are schedul 
ed for a particular day in the morning or afternoon. If 
claimants report at the wrong time once, it is simply noted in 
their file; if it occurs a second tune, a question is raised about 
then* availability, and a determination is made. Failing to 
respond to a referral call-in card also prompts an investiga 
tion of possible availability issues. ERP interviews are con 
ducted every 10 weeks after the initial claim, and they focus 
on determining the adequacy of job-search efforts and 
availability for work. If a question arises about either re 
quirement, the claimant may be required to submit continu 
ing claims in person.
State 2 also follows certain practices which would seem to 
enhance the agency's ability to identify potential issues. The 
weekly filing process requires claimants to submit informa 
tion on employer contacts. These contacts are listed by the 
claimant on a form which is reviewed and then returned to 
the claimant for use with subsequent claims. Thus, when this 
form is reviewed by agency staff, they have in front of them 
a multiple-week list of up to 40 employer contacts, which 
may make it easier to spot repetitive employer entries, 
suspicious patterns that may suggest fabricated contacts 
(e.g., alphabetically listed employers), or other reasons to 
question work-search activity. The number of employer con 
tacts is checked on each submission. A warning is issued the 
first time that the claimant reports too few contacts; the sec 
ond time, the determination process is initiated. Moreover, 
the agency conducts an ongoing audit of employer contacts, 
verifying 1 percent of all contacts reported. Although such a 
sample may only marginally affect the probability that 
misinformation will be discovered, the knowledge that this 
procedure is followed may deter claimants from submitting 
false contact information. ERP interviews are conducted 
every four to seven weeks for claimants who are not on tern-
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porary lay-off and focus clearly on detecting potential 
eligibility issues. For new claimants who are viewed as hav 
ing potential able/available issues, an ERP is scheduled a 
week after the initial filing. The agency also provides 
employers with a stock of forms on which they can initiate a 
report of recall or job refusal.
Some of our observations during the State 3 site visit sug 
gest that this state may be less effective in identifying 
nonseparation issues. As pointed out in Section A, very few 
State 3 claimants register with the employment service and 
have any real chance of being referred to an employer. 
Moreover, state policy requirements for work-search ac 
tivities do not seem to be followed consistently. State policy 
requires claimants to report two employer contacts per week 
in order to continue receiving benefits. However, in neither 
of the offices we visited did staff appear to follow this policy 
exactly. In the urban office, if contacts were missing from 
the claimant's report, the agency seemed to follow up by 
providing claimants with information on program re 
quirements, but only hi rare cases did it initiate a determina 
tion. In the rural office, the perception of policy is that 
claimants are not required to make any contacts for the first 
10 weeks. The policy which exempts employer-attached 
claimants from ES registration and work-search re 
quirements for 10 weeks seems to affect the treatment of all 
claimants. ERP interviews in State 3 are supposed to be held 
every 10 weeks, but the reported average interval between 
ERPs is 13 weeks.
State 4 seems to schedule ERPs more effectively than does 
State 3, setting a maximum interval of ten weeks, but 
scheduling them at four-, six-, or eight-week intervals if any 
question arises at intake about the claimant's ability to 
demonstrate continuing eligibility. Conversely, State 4 seems 
to take a fairly relaxed approach toward monitoring work-
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search activity and dealing with claimants' responses to job 
referrals. Claims reviewers reportedly question only the most 
"outrageous" information (such as a list of employers which 
includes the names of well-known sports figures). One 
respondent said that a determination would not be required 
even if a claimant appeared to be listing employers 
alphabetically from the telephone directory. Employer con 
tacts are not verified. The agency also responds mildly to 
problems in referring claimants to employers. The common 
rule of thumb followed in State 4 is that only when three 
referral call-ins have been ignored will an issue be raised, 
which is considerably more tolerant than the practices of 
States 1 and 2.
With respect to weekly claims, State 5 follows a practice 
which would seem to increase the number of issues raised, 
but which would not necessarily increase the probability that 
they will lead to denials. Able and available issues probably 
arise most often from the agency's reporting requirements 
and the claimants' failure to comply with them. Claimants 
scheduled for in-person filing or an ERP interview are told 
to appear on a specific day at a specific hour. If the claimant 
appears for claims filing at the wrong time, it is noted in the 
file. By the third time it occurs, the claimant is referred to an 
adjudicator for determination. If a claimant fails to appear 
once for an ERP interview at the proper time, a determina 
tion is made. Particularly in the urban office, where a high 
percentage of claimants are reportedly on continuing per 
sonal filing, this tightly scheduled reporting regimen may ex 
pand the number of determinations. However, failure to 
report at the right hour may be less indicative of the claim 
ant* s unavailability for work than would, for instance, fail 
ing to report on a scheduled day.
Conversely, State 5 seems to expose claimants to a 
minimal risk of being questioned about refusing work or
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referrals. Weekly claim cards ask claimants whether they had 
"refused work without good cause," allowing them to pro 
vide their owji interpretation of state policy rather than a 
straightforward account of facts. Moreover, very few 
claimants are likely to be referred to jobs by the employment 
service. Under State 5 policy, claimants are not required to 
register with the employment service if they expect to be 
recalled to their jobs within 13 weeks (a long period com 
pared with other states), but work-load pressures on the 
employment service have created practices that are even less 
rigorous. In the rural office, the employment service requests 
that claimants not be referred for registration if they had any 
expectation of recall; in the urban office, the stated policy is 
to register everyone after 13 weeks of unemployment but not 
to register anyone before that period. The employment ser 
vice clearly seems to focus on registering individuals who 
volunteer and who appear to be the most interested in ob 
taining employment with the agency's help. The result, 
however, is that claimants who are most likely to refuse 
employment without good cause are the least at risk for 
referral.
The likelihood that nonseparation determination issues 
will be raised in State 6 is probably affected by the agency's 
minimal emphasis on work search and by problems in main 
taining a regular schedule of ERP interviews. State 6 does 
not require claimants to report any work-search activity on 
the weekly claim card; thus, no regular, frequent basis exists 
for examining claimants' continuing exposure to the job 
market, which is of course one measure of then* attachment 
to the labor market and of then* availability for work. In ad 
dition, due to staffing cuts, State 6 has had considerable dif 
ficulty in achieving its objective of holding ERP interviews 
every eight weeks for each claimant. For instance, the urban 
office we visited had not held any ERPs in the five months 
prior to our visit.
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C Fact-Finding and Dedsionmaking
Once the UI agency identifies a nonmonetary eligibility 
issue on the basis of either statements made by the claimant 
or information provided by employers, a process of fact- 
finding and interpreting reported facts leads to a decision 
about the merits of the claim—a determination. This process 
includes two distinct functions: gathering information as a 
basis for making these decisions and considering the facts in 
light of state laws and regulations.
Although all states in our sample appear to provide 
guidance for fact-finding and decisionmaking, the variation 
hi the detail and precision of state regulations and pro 
cedures commented on in Sections A and B of this chapter 
clearly has some potential impact on how determinations are 
reached. In our site visits, we did not find specific complaints 
about inconsistent or unfounded determination decisions, 
but consistency and justification are clearly a concern of the 
states. 5 All use some type of procedure for reviewing and 
performing quality control on determination decisions (see 
Section D for a discussion on the approaches adopted for en 
suring quality control).
The determination process follows different patterns hi 
the six sample states. The fact-finding process also varies in 
several ways. First, some states seem to conduct frequent 
preliminary, informal inquiries to confirm whether an issue 
merits formal determination; other states treat every issue 
that has been identified through routine claims review as a 
basis for formal determination. States also seem to differ in 
the extent to which they encourage employers to participate 
in the fact-finding process or actively draw them into it. 
Determining eligibility based on the facts, usually called 
"adjudication," is also a process which varies somewhat 
among the six states. Some variation exists in terms of who 
performs adjudications, and the manner in which decisions
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are prepared and notifications are produced is not complete 
ly uniform.
State 1, like most other states, makes determinations at the 
local office level. What is somewhat unusual, however, is 
that nonmonetary determinations, including fact-finding 
and adjudication, are a responsibility which rotates among 
all of the local office nonclerical claims staff, as opposed to 
being assigned only to the senior or most highly qualified 
staff. As a corollary to this practice, all claims staff learn to 
make determinations through on-the-job observation and 
training, which may affect their performance in handling ini 
tial claims routinely by giving them a more thorough founda 
tion in and frequent exposure to state policy guidelines. On 
the other hand, assigning determinations on a rotating basis 
may mean that relatively junior staff will perform some 
determinations, which may detract from the consistency with 
which rules are interpreted and applied. State 1 is also 
noteworthy in terms of the degree to which it insists that 
employers provide input to the determination process and 
the extent to which the state uses that input. If an employer 
report is not returned or if a separation issue has been noted 
by the claims taker and the claimant's facts contradict the 
employer's report, an adjudicator will contact the employer 
by telephone. In either situation, no claim will be processed 
without information or clarification from the employer. 
Moreover, the adjudicator does not require any written 
follow-up on information received from the employer by 
telephone, which avoids one potential barrier to employer in 
put observed in other states.
The fact-finding and determination processes in State 2 
also focus on obtaining full information from both the 
claimant and the employer whenever relevant, but its pro 
cedures place some greater demands on employers. The 
agency treats employers as a source of information that can
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potentially raise both separation and nonseparation issues. 
The agency provides employers with a stock of forms on 
which the employer may initiate reports of quits, discharges, 
or refusals; it also solicits information from the employer on 
separation issues as they arise for individual cases. An 
employer's written protest, submitted on forms from the 
agency or sent at its own initiative, must include a detailed 
explanation of any issue cited by that employer. Further 
more, fact-finding is conducted in scheduled interviews in 
the local office to which an employer representative and the 
claimant are invited. Decisions are based on written informa 
tion received prior to the interview and evidence presented in 
it; if the employer does not attend, no effort will be made to 
elicit further information. Agency respondents reported that 
employers attend about 25 percent of these adjudication in 
terviews, and viewed this as a low attendance rate.6
The fact-finding and determination processes in State 2 
seem particularly well designed to ensure that sufficient in 
formation is collected and that consistency is maintained in 
how the process is conducted and what information is pro 
vided to the parties at various steps. Employer information is 
actively sought, but all information must be submitted in 
writing or presented at the formal interview at which the 
claimant is present. A clear set of step-by-step guidelines on 
what should be covered in a determination interview was set 
forth by agency staff. State 2 sends copies of employer 
reports to claimants and always informs both the claimant 
and the employer in writing about a scheduled fact-finding 
interview. Decisions are very closely constrained by the 
detailed regulations on all aspects of nonmonetary policy. 
Finally, consistency hi justifying decisions is promoted 
through a computer system that allows adjudicators to select 
among a standard list of regulation codes and then 
automatically prints the appropriate explanatory text on 
notification decisions sent to the parties.
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The fact-finding and adjudication processes in State 3 ap 
pear to screen out some issues that would be resolved in 
favor of the claimant before the formal determination stage, 
to involve employers in the process to a lesser degree than in 
States 1 and 2, and to focus on judging the severity of the 
claimant's offense rather than on establishing whether one 
occurred. Information from employers triggers only 
separation-related determinations, since no mechanism ex 
ists to report recall refusals, as in State 2. Some separation 
determinations are short-circuited by informal inquiry; 
claims adjudicators sometimes call employers prior to any 
formal determination interview if the reported facts do not 
seem to support then* protests. It appears that such cases can 
lead to an informal resolution of an identified issue without 
a reported determination process. When an adjudication in 
terview is held, it may or may not include the employer. 
Employers will generally attend only if a sharp discrepancy 
exists between the facts reported by the employer and the 
claimant, and respondents in State 3 reported that such cases 
occur very rarely. Most interviews include only the claimant 
and the adjudicator. Moreover, it should be remembered 
that State 3 provides for two levels of penalties for separa 
tion and refusal denials. As a result of these factors, it ap 
pears that State 3 in effect conducts formal determinations 
only when the chances of denial are high. Adjudication biter- 
views usually focus on the degree of the claimant's offense, 
for purposes of establishing the length of the disqualification 
period.
In State 4, fact-finding and decisionmaking are two 
separate functions. For disqualification issues (quit, miscon 
duct, and refusal), fact-finding is performed at the local of 
fice, and adjudication is performed at the central state of 
fice. For able and available issues, fact-finding and adjudica 
tion are performed by local office staff. Not surprisingly, us 
ing central office staff for all other adjudication purposes (a
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process which was instituted in order to lower administrative 
costs and to increase the consistency of decisionmaking) af 
fects the methods used by local staff for fact-finding pur 
poses. State 4 does not use scheduled interviews that require 
the presence of both the employer and the claimant. 
Claimants are expected to provide a completed fact-finding 
report, and employers may submit a written protest on 
separation issues. Claimants are allowed to see any material 
submitted by the employer and to prepare a rebuttal. Both 
the employer's and the claimant's reports (including a rebut 
tal in some cases) are sent to the central adjudicator. The ad 
judicator may call either party if further information is 
necessary. The fact-finding process in State 4 differs from 
the process in the other states in that it does not contain a 
provision for an interview in which both parties participate 
at the same time. Moreover, adjudicators never deal with the 
parties face to face. Consequently, adjudicators may find it 
more difficult to judge the credibility of the parties.
Central adjudication in State 4 may mean that the quality 
of evidence available to decisionmakers is not as complete as 
what might be available if fact-finding and determinations 
were undertaken by the same person. Moreover, central ad 
judication may undermine the decision process to the extent 
that both parties feel that their positions are not given the 
proper attention. The high incidence of appeals hi State 4 
supports both contentions. In 1982, first-level appeals were 
made on over 22 percent of all determinations, ranking the 
state among the top five in the country. Moreover, the deter 
minations which tended to be appealed were clearly those 
which were adjudicated centrally. Appeals were filed on less 
than 5 percent of able and available determinations, ranking 
State 4 among the lowest five states according to this 
measure.
State 5 maintains a fact-finding and adjudication process 
which is heavily affected by federal timeliness standards for
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paying initial claims and by state court decisions which re 
quire determination decisions within 72 hours after a claim 
ant has filed for the week in question. The state UI agency 
responds to these time pressures through procedures that in 
clude rapid fact-finding, frequent use of telephone discus 
sions to collect information, some screening of issues before 
they become formal determinations, and a low emphasis on 
formal notifications and advance notice of hearing sessions. 
When a separation issue is noted on an initial claims form or 
is signaled by an employer report form, or when nonsepara- 
tion issues arise from job refusals or ERP interviews, claims 
adjudicators act quickly to clarify whether a formal deter 
mination is necessary. When an initial claim points to a 
possible separation issue, an adjudicator conducts a fact- 
finding interview before the claimant leaves the office, 
perhaps calling the employer by telephone in the claimant's 
presence. If such a fact-finding interview indicates either a 
consistent set of facts from the two parties to support benefit 
denial or conflicting statements that require a judgment 
about credibility, the adjudicator will ask the claimant to file 
a claim for the waiting week, since a claim must be filed 
before a determination decision can be issued. The employer 
would still be required to submit a written report form on the 
reason for separation. If necessary, a predetermination hear 
ing with both parties would then be held. However, if the 
fact-finding interview indicated no reason for benefit denial, 
the matter would be dropped. The rapid follow-up pro 
cedures on separation issues hi State 5 and the practice of 
collecting all the facts before the first weekly claim is filed 
may mean that issues which in other states are reported as 
determinations are eliminated in State 5.
Time pressures also influence the handling of nonsepara- 
tion issues in State 5. When issues are discovered while the 
claimant is hi the office for a personal filing or an ERP inter 
view, the fact-finding interview is held immediately. If an
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issue arises after the claim has been filed for the week in 
question, a formal notification is mailed to the claimant, but 
the adjudicator also telephones the claimant to schedule an 
interview immediately. No waiting time or advance notice is 
required. When the fact-finding interview is held, the claim 
ant's statements will be taken into evidence, as will any writ 
ten statement that may have been submitted by an employer 
(e.g., for refusals); in most cases, a decision will then be 
issued the same evening.
State 6, although not under the same court-imposed 
pressures for rapid determinations as State 5, also follows 
procedures which appear likely to resolve some issues before 
they reach the formal determination stage, particularly those 
that are raised by employers' protests over separation 
reasons. The agency seems to place strong emphasis on hav 
ing employers present evidence of a strong case before the 
determination process is formally undertaken. For instance, 
the form which is sent to employers to ask whether they 
question the claimant's eligibility for benefits also asks for a 
detailed explanation of the reasons for protest, and it warns 
that failing to provide such detailed information may 
preclude consideration of their protest by the agency. 
Despite this urging, agency staff report that they must fre 
quently call employers to clarify information, particularly 
for misconduct issues. One respondent stated that this 
screening process prompts many employers to drop their 
protests, although the agency clearly makes no explicit at 
tempt to discourage the pursuit of a protest.
State 6 follows a determination schedule that is much 
more heavily influenced by due process and advance notice 
requirements, and less by time pressures, than is true in State 
5. Once it is clear that a real issue exists, a formal notice of a 
hearing date is sent to both the employer and the claimant 
(or only to the claimant in most nonseparation issues), giving
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them between five and seven days' advance warning. Deter 
mination decisions are also not issued as quickly as in State 
5. The agency's objective is to complete all determinations 
by the end of the week in which the hearing is held, and to 
comply with federal timeliness standards.
D. Agency Characteristics
Parts of the interviews conducted with central and local 
agency staff in the sample states dealt with their organiza 
tional characteristics and internal management concerns. 
Four topics were covered to at least some extent in most of 
the states: (1) the formal structure of the UI agency and its 
organizational relationship to the employment service; 
(2) the methods used at the state and local office levels to 
monitor the performance of claims functions in general and 
nonmonetary determinations in particular; (3) the 
characteristics of local office staff; and (4) the extent and 
type of training provided to local office staff. Although 
these discussions at times touched on particular problems 
that may have been encountered recently by an office or 
state, the information obtained does not indicate any clear, 
systematic differences among the states along these dimen 
sions. However, several observations or themes that seem 
common to most or all of the states emerged.
One clear theme from the interviews is the importance of 
experience as a qualification to perform nonmonetary deter 
minations. Whether claims adjudicators (variously referred 
to as "examiners," "specialists," and "deputies") are pro 
moted from claims-taker positions or are hired from outside 
the agency, the methods for training them clearly stress on- 
the-job observation, periods of close supervision and review, 
and periods of assignment to a variety of related tasks. Only 
a few states appear to operate more formal training sessions. 
To the extent that they do use these sessions, they appear
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likely to stress general interviewing techniques when provid 
ed for new staff; under budgetary or other pressures, the ses 
sions tend to fall into disuse. Formal training for experienced 
staff, when provided, is apparently designed to explain new 
ly introduced policies or procedures and seems likely to be 
given only to lead staff.
The importance of experience for examiners is also 
reflected in respondents' comments about the use of tem 
porary or intermittent staff. This practice is followed in all 
of the states to facilitate adjusting staff levels to the volume 
of claims, but appears to varying degrees to create concerns 
about whether the more demanding roles in the local offices 
are staffed with adequately qualified and experienced staff. 
In some of the offices we visited, temporary staff filled the 
majority of claims-related positions. Most state and local of 
fices focus on using the most experienced staff for the most 
demanding determination issues. Intermittent staff, and par 
ticularly the less experienced intermittent staff, are typically 
assigned to the initial claims line, which requires less judg 
ment and knowledge of policy than do determinations. 
However, one respondent in State 3 noted that the degree to 
which intermittent staff must be used means that determina 
tions are also performed by staff who possess less than fully 
desirable experience.
The necessity of relying heavily on temporary staff to re 
tain flexibility also seems to contribute to staff turnover, 
since temporary staff, rather than maintain a long-term com 
mitment to the agency, will often use these positions as a 
stepping stone for other jobs with more stable work, better 
benefits, and clearer career advancement possibilities. Staff 
ing a considerable portion of local office positions with in 
dividuals who possess intermittent job experience or relative 
ly short tenure contributes to concerns about the agency's 
ability to identify determination issues.
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Concern about the quality and consistency of determina 
tions has led all of the states to undertake some type of 
monitoring and quality control. Typically, central office 
staff use one or both of two devices: a review of monthly 
statistical reports on determinations and reversals, with 
follow-up action when particular problems are revealed; and 
annual audits or reviews of each office, including an ex 
amination of individual determination cases. Only in State 1 
did we observe any specific criteria used in central office 
monitoring which would trigger an inquiry by management 
and remedial intervention with respect to local office opera 
tions. Although the program rules in State 1 allow compell 
ing personal reasons as justifications for voluntary separa 
tion, state officials are concerned about excessive benefit 
awards in such situations. Whenever claimants who have 
quit voluntarily and have been awarded benefits account for 
more than 10 percent of all separation-related determina 
tions, state officials will investigate. However, from our in 
terviews, it was impossible for us to judge the effectiveness 
of these monitoring efforts or their effect on performance. 
Similarly, although local office procedures to ensure quality 
and consistency typically entailed a review by senior staff of 
determinations made by junior staff, we could not find any 
examples of particularly strong or weak efforts to control 
quality by these means.
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NOTES
1. To derive the quintiles, we ranked all SO states plus the District of Col 
umbia for each determination and denial rate. We then divided each 
ranking list into five parts for states 1-10,11-20,21-30,31-40, and 41-51.
2. "Unattached" claimants are those who do not expect to be recalled by 
the employer which laid them off.
3. It should be noted that a number of states quite clearly had adjusted 
the rigor of their registration requirements because of the high level of 
unemployment at the tune of our visits and because of the consequent 
difficulties faced by the employment service in finding job referrals for 
registrants in general and for UI claimants in particular.
4. The states use a variety of job titles to describe the functions perform 
ed by staff in the UI offices. The job of taking initial claims forms at in 
take is performed by staff who are usually referred to as "claims takers" 
or "claims interviewers." Fact-finding, determinations, and Eligibility 
Review Process interviews are usually performed by staff who are refer 
red to as "examiners," "adjudicators," "claims specialists," or 
"deputies."
5. As measured by the Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance 
Quality Appraisal Results, all six sample states maintain high standards 
for the quality of nonmonetary determinations. With one exception (the 
performance of one state on nonseparation determinations in 1981), all 
states have achieved desired levels of quality over the fiscal years 
1980-1982.
6. One State 2 respondent suggested that employers do not generally take 
part in these interviews because they prefer to avoid the burden of par 
ticipating, to take their chances on wuming a denial based on their writ 
ten protest, and to appeal the decision if necessary. The respondent sug 
gested that employers thus "overuse" the appeals process. In fact, data 
for one quarter in 1980 confirm that employer-initiated appeals are 
undertaken for about 6 percent of all determinations, ranking this state 





The research undertaken for this project addresses an im 
portant question for UI program managers and 
policymakers: what steps can be taken to make the non- 
monetary eligibility determination process contribute most 
effectively to the integrity of the unemployment insurance 
program in the states? More specifically, the patterns observ 
ed in the regression and process analysis may suggest how 
nonmonetary determinations can help state agencies 
(1) minimize the extent to which claimants violate non- 
monetary eligibility rules and (2) maximize then* ability to 
detect violations when they occur and to reduce or deny 
benefits accordingly.
It is important to begin our interpretation of state 
characteristics and denial rates with a recognition of these 
two aspects of program integrity. Although our analysis 
must focus on the rates at which states deny benefits for non- 
monetary reasons, high denial rates hi themselves clearly do 
not necessarily mean that program management goals have 
been achieved most effectively. In a state that effectively 
disseminates information about program requirements and 
ensures a relatively well-informed public, denial rates might 
be low because relatively few ineligible individuals attempt to 
receive benefits. However, such an outcome could be viewed 
positively from the standpoint of program managers. 
Although our analysis in this chapter must use denial rates as
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the primary basis for comparing states, we have also devoted 
attention to possible ways in which state practices may be af 
fecting denial rates by affecting the stream of applicants for 
benefits.
This chapter presents our efforts to glean inferences from 
the site visits about the effects of state policies and pro 
cedures, administrative methods, and agency characteristics 
on both denial rates and, more generally, program integrity. 
Section A briefly discusses how we have analyzed the site 
visit data. Section B then presents summary characteriza 
tions of each state, with comments on what appear to explain 
the denial rate patterns in each state. Section C offers some 
concluding observations about the effects of program policy 
and administration on denial rates, based on patterns across 
the six sample states.
A. Analytical Approach
Our process analysis consisted of three logical steps. First, 
we attempted to identify the peculiarities of the denial rates 
in each state for 1982. By using the exact rates for the fre 
quency of determinations, the denials as a percentage of 
determinations, and the net denial rates that underlie table 
4.1, we assessed how the rate of each state compared with 
those of other states and looked for anomalies in the rate 
patterns within each state. On the one hand, we were in 
terested in whether for particular rates, such as the frequency 
of misconduct-related denials, a state ranked high or low 
compared with other states. On the other hand, we were also 
interested in whether apparent inconsistencies existed within 
the overall rates observed for a state. If, for example, a state 
generally had very low rates of determination but had a very 
high rate for one particular issue, such an anomaly would 
provide a basis for considering policy and administrative 
characteristics. These inter- and intra-state peculiarities serve 
as the "dependent variables" for our process analysis.
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The second step was to undertake a structured and 
systematic comparison of the site visit information for the 
six states. Tables were constructed for each of the major 
stages of the determination process (eligibility rules, detec 
tion, and fact-finding and decisionmaking) and for each of 
the nonmonetary denial reasons. The site visit reports, which 
contained extensive descriptive information, were combed 
for relevant entries to these tables. This process identified the 
peculiarities that distinguished the policy and administration 
of each state from those of the other states, and provided the 
"independent variables" for the process analysis.
The third step was to find connections between the policy 
and administrative characteristics of the states and their 
denial rates. This analysis proved rewarding, in that ap 
parent explanations for denial rate patterns in individual 
states did emerge. However, before offering our conclusions 
about these connections, we should note that the analytic 
method and our conclusions should be approached cautious 
ly, for three reasons: the reliability of our data, then* 
usefulness as a basis for drawing generalizations, and the ex 
tent to which we can infer causal relationships from the ap 
parent patterns we observed.
To perform the analysis described above, we must give 
considerable weight to the comments and perceptions of our 
relatively few respondents in each state. Comments about 
the ways in which certain types of claimant situations are 
handled, or statements such as, "Lots of times we do it that 
way," form the basis for our impressions of the less for 
malized aspects of state procedures. The very nature of the 
process analysis approach necessitates that we use such in 
formation only with the understanding that we might be 
oversimplifying or even distorting the patterns of practice 
that might emerge from a more detailed, structured, and 
time-consuming data collection effort.
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Even if we were completely confident that our information 
on each state was completely accurate and reliable, con 
siderable difficulties would still remain in drawing 
generalizations about each state from our conclusions. Many 
of the denial rate peculiarities we observed are distinctive to 
particular states, and what we found noteworthy about state 
policies and practices was often unique to an individual 
state. Thus, most of the connections we found between pro 
gram characteristics and denial rates were based on an ex 
amination of one or perhaps two states, rather than on any 
strong patterns across all of the states. Finding a connection 
in one state did not indicate that the same relationship ex 
isted elsewhere in our sample or in other states.
Most important, it is very difficult to draw inferences 
about causality from what we observed. Even though a par 
ticular set of rules or practices hi a state appears to con 
tribute to the observed denial rates, we realize that many 
other variables in program administration may be affecting 
the same denial rates but cannot systematically be observed. 
Although our conclusions may offer some guidance to states 
as they consider program policy and management options, 
clearly there should be no expectation that adopting the 
practices of another state will necessarily affect denial rates 
in the desired way.
B. State-By-State Analyses
For each of the six sampled states, we present a summary 
of denial rate patterns and the major features of their 
policies, procedures, and agency characteristics, as well as 
our conclusions about how the latter affect the former. 
Whereas in chapter 4 we focused on presenting the range of 
policy and administrative characteristics for particular 
aspects of the nonmonetary eligibility process, here we focus 
on each state, drawing together all aspects of the process in
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an attempt to explain the denial rate outcomes of the specific 
states.
State 1
State 1 ranks very high among all states in terms of the fre 
quency with which it identifies determination issues. Its 
determination rates rank it in the first quintile for miscon 
duct and able/available determinations, and in the second 
quintile for voluntary quit and refusal determinations (see 
table 4.1), However, State 1 does not deny benefits in an 
unusually high percentage of cases for which determinations 
are performed, ranking in the fourth quintile hi denials for 
misconduct, able/available, and refusal issues, and in the 
fifth quintile for voluntary quit denials. Because the net 
denial rates are heavily influenced by the high frequency of 
determinations, the state ranks in the second quintile for 
three denial rates and in the first quintile for one.
The high rates of determination in State 1 appear to be 
caused by three major factors: (1) detailed and specific 
regulations that impose some relatively stringent eligibility 
requirements and define clear standards against which claim 
ant situations and behavior can be measured; (2) procedures 
for detecting potential determination issues that promote 
employer input and encourage agency staff to pursue ques 
tionable claimant information; and (3) a local office staff 
structure which may enhance the ability to identify issues.
The detail and thoroughness of the regulations in State 1 
far exceed what have been developed hi all of the other sam 
ple states, with the possible exception of State 2. The regula 
tions in State 1 break each eligibility requirement down into 
the specific demands it places on claimants, providing ex 
planations of underlying intent, case examples, and accom 
panying recommended decisions. One might expect that, 
because the very detailed regulations would allow precise
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judgments to be made in the issue identification stage, most 
claimants who are brought to determination would be denied 
benefits. However, that is not the case in State 1, a fact 
which probably reflects the state's emphasis on initiating the 
determination process whenever a possible issue arises, 
rather than only when a clear case for denial exists. Instead, 
the detailed regulations appear to require that the facts in the 
decision stage be carefully developed and weighed, as 
reflected in the moderate rates at which determinations lead 
to denials.
Regulations in State 1 also pose some eligibility re 
quirements that are relatively stringent, and which may thus 
lead to determinations and denials in situations that would 
not occur in other states. For instance, the definition of 
misconduct includes one example of cause for discharge that 
clearly goes beyond what is found in the other state regula 
tions: the failure of an employee to perform as productively 
as he/she had performed at an earlier time, thus indicating 
indifference or negligence. Similarly, the definition of job 
refusal hi State 1 includes actions or behavior by the claim 
ant which would indicate a deliberate effort to fail the job in 
terview. The state's standard for partial-week availability is 
also the strictest among the six states: a claimant unavailable 
for more than one day in a week is to be denied benefits for 
that week. Finally, the requirements hi State 1 for employ 
ment service registration are rigorous relative to other states 
in our sample: only claimants who expect to be recalled 
within 30 days or who normally obtain employment through 
a union hiring process are excused from immediate registra 
tion, and only for 30 days.
The record of State 1 in terms of identifying a high 
number of determination issues seems to be a product largely 
of the manner in which claims staff seek out employers' in 
put to the initial claims review process, and of the manner in
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which eligibility rules and procedures prompt an investiga 
tion of ongoing claims reports. Procedures clearly prohibit 
processing initial claims without obtaining separation-reason 
information from the last employer, and examiners will 
telephone employers persistently until that information is 
obtained. If information received over the telephone in 
dicates the existence of a determination issue, the agency will 
initiate the determination process rather than insist upon a 
detailed written explanation, as is true in some other states. 
Compared with other states, State 1 thus makes it easier for 
employers to voice objections and may in fact raise issues 
that employers already paying a maximum tax rate might not 
even have bothered initiating themselves.
The ongoing eligibility determination process in State 1 is 
designed to promote staff initiative in identifying the ques 
tionable availability of claimants. Rather than requiring a 
routine report of two or three employer contacts per week, 
State 1 demands an initial account of employer contacts 
made during the two weeks between application for benefits 
and the first benefit-week claim, and again at the 10-week 
eligibility reviews. Instead of devoting staff resources every 
week to counting employer contacts whose seriousness and 
validity are often difficult to assess from a simple claim card, 
staff resources are devoted at relatively long intervals (every 
ten weeks in most cases) to evaluating for each individual 
case whether a sincere and reasonable employment search is 
being made. If job-search efforts are questionable, the 
claims staff can either require the claimant to file in person 
and to present more detailed and frequent search evidence, 
or initiate a determination.
The method for questioning claimants on weekly claim 
cards and the state's standard for ongoing availability also 
encourage pursuing potential issues. Claimants are asked for 
straightforward facts on claim cards (e.g., Did you refuse a
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job?) rather than for an interpretation of their actions. At 
least one other state in our sample asks whether the claimant 
had ''refused a job without good cause." State 1 claimants 
are asked whether they were available for the entire week, 
even though the actual eligibility standard allows them one 
day of unavailability. Other states ask a comparable ques 
tion: "Were you available for work every day but one?" The 
effect, and probably the intention, in State 1 is to identify 
questionable claimant behavior and initiate determinations 
on that basis, rather than simply to identify situations in 
which a denial is very likely. The fact that only two days of 
unavailability will lead to a week's denial of benefits also en 
courages claims staff to investigate the reasons for a claim 
ant's failing to respond to a single referral attempt or the 
reasons that prompted a claimant to show up at the agency 
for personal reporting at the wrong time on a second occa 
sion. Such investigation raises the incidence of refusal issues 
and probably lowers the rate of refusal-related denials, since 
such investigations count as determinations but are relatively 
unlikely to lead to the conclusion that a claimant is actually 
refusing employment. However, they do frequently uncover 
situations in which availability standards have been violated, 
and may lead to denials on that issue.
The local office staffing approach adopted in State 1 may 
also contribute to its high rate of determinations and denials. 
Aside from clerical and managerial staff, all claims staff 
have the same title and are rotated among all claims tasks, 
including initial claims interviewing, fact-finding, and deter 
minations. Checking ongoing claim cards is the responsibili 
ty of mail room clerical staff, and they initiate determina 
tions on any card with a "wrong" answer. Ongoing claim 
forms ask only "yes/no" questions about availability and 
job refusal issues, but do not ask for information on 
employer contacts. The review of claim cards does not re 
quire any judgment, and can be performed by clerical staff.
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As a result of this staffing approach, staff with constant ex 
posure to state policy and regulations are involved in the in 
itial claims process and are free to concentrate their efforts 
on pursuing potential separation issues and eligibility reviews 
rather than on routinely reviewing claim forms.
State 2
State 2 resembles State 1 hi that it has developed quite 
detailed regulations to guide the determination process, but 
it also appears noteworthy for the efficiency with which it 
uses its staff and its quite advanced use of computer system 
support for the determination process. Despite these 
characteristics, State 2 holds a middle rank in terms of 
denials, placing in the third quintile nationally for voluntary 
quit, misconduct, and job refusal denials, and hi the second 
quintile for able/available denials. The rate at which it 
makes determinations is lower than the rate of State 1, 
although higher than the rates of states 3 through 6.
The UI program in State 2 seems to operate under 
thorough, careful control. Rules are delineated in great 
detail hi the regulations. For instance, State 2 is the only one 
of the six we examined which defines explicitly when and by 
what percentages claimants must adjust then* wage demands 
over the period of unemployment to be considered available 
for suitable work. It is also the only state which appears to 
undertake any systematic auditing of employer contacts 
reported by claimants on weekly claim forms. All determina 
tions are conducted according to clear guidelines, which in 
clude requirements that all information be submitted in 
writing, and that both parties be appropriately notified prior 
to a disputed claim. The state provides two alternative forms 
on which employers can submit information to protest a 
claim: a special form maintained by employers to report 
quits, discharges for misconduct, or job recall refusals, and a 
form sent by the agency to the employer to request separa-
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tion information when an initial claim is filed. ERP inter 
views are conducted more frequently in State 2 than in any of 
the other five states; the agency schedules them at four- to 
seven-week intervals for claimants who are not job- 
attached.
From the information we gathered, no clear explanation 
emerges as to why the determination and denial rates of State 
2 should be considerably lower than those of State 1, 
although some of the rules and practices in State 2 are less 
stringent than hi State 1. Claimants must be available three 
days out of a week to avoid being denied benefits, rather 
than four as in State 1. Despite regulatory language which 
appears to give claims staff in both states similar latitude in 
defining the job-search effort required of each claimant, 
State 2 actually uses a fairly routine operational standard of 
two contacts per week, without the infrequent but in 
dividualized assessment of job-search efforts that appears to 
be true in State 1. However, State 2 facilitates the review of 
reported contacts by using a multi-week reporting form that 
allows claims staff to review the recent history of reported 
contacts each week. This helps staff detect fabricated 
employer contacts or repetitive entries of employers.
The two types of factors that may explain the differences 
between the rate patterns in States 1 and 2 are external fac 
tors and factors that represent a potential deterrent effect, 
and in neither case can we observe anything to substantiate 
our speculation. Any underlying employment and 
unemployment patterns may simply create a population of 
claimants who are less likely to be ineligible on the basis of 
theu: circumstances or less likely to apply for benefits if they 
are ineligible. Some possibility exists that the overall impres 
sion of efficiency and thoroughness presented by the UI 
agency may convince potentially ineligible individuals not to 
apply, or convince ongoing claimants to adhere as closely as
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possible to formal requirements to avoid being denied 
benefits.
State 3
The pattern of determination and denial rates in State 3 is 
particularly striking, given the very high rates at which deter 
minations lead to denials. In 1982, the state ranked in the 
first quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations 
for all four denial reasons. However, determinations are per 
formed at much lower frequencies than in other states. State 
3 ranks hi the third quintile for separation determinations, 
approximately at the middle of the state ranking. For 
nonseparation issues, State 3 ranks very low in terms of the 
number of determinations made—near the bottom of the 
fifth quintile for able/available issues and in the fourth quin 
tile for refusal issues. The high rates at which determinations 
lead to denials pull the net denial rates up slightly above the 
determination rankings, so that State 3 ranks in the first 
quintile for denials based on misconduct and hi the second 
quintile for denials based on voluntary quits and refusals, 
but in the fifth quintile for able/available denials. These 
1982 rankings were slightly below the regression-adjusted 
rankings for the entire 1964-1981 period reported in chapter 
2. The regression-adjusted rankings of State 3 fell within the 
first quintile for voluntary quits, misconduct, and job 
refusals, and hi the fourth quintile for able/available issues.
The high rates at which determinations lead to denials for 
separation issues in State 3 appear to be caused by its two- 
level definition of eligibility requirements and the corres 
ponding two-level definition of penalties. Claimants can be 
denied benefits for misconduct if they are discharged for 
almost any other reason than a lack of work, but the penalty 
imposed is only five to ten weeks without benefits, rather 
than disqualification for the duration of employment if the 
discharge were for gross misconduct. Similarly, claimants
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can be denied benefits for a period of five to ten weeks rather 
than for the duration of unemployment if they quit without 
good cause but can demonstrate valid personal cir 
cumstances to justify their actions.
The milder penalty that can be imposed with less evidence 
against the claimant appears to affect both the nature of the 
determination process and the decisions of adjudicators. 
Agency respondents reported that almost any voluntary 
separation or discharge would lead to benefit denial, and 
that the hearing process, which typically involves only the 
claimant and the adjudicator, usually focuses on the severity 
of the penalty that would be appropriate.
Although the definition of gross misconduct hi State 3 
closely resembles the definition of simple misconduct in the 
other states, there is some evidence that the availability of 
the lower-level denial penalty may lead to some laxity hi 
detecting issues and in undertaking fact-finding. For in 
stance, some respondents suggested that many claimants 
simply wait 10 weeks after separation before applying for 
benefits (i.e., voluntarily "self-serving" their penalties), 
knowing that they would be disqualified for 10 weeks at 
most under the milder penalty. It may be that in such cir 
cumstances the agency places little emphasis on determining 
whether it should impose the more severe penalty that re 
quires reemployment and substantial earnings. The fact that 
the milder penalty is imposed in two-thirds of misconduct 
denials suggests either a weak search for misconduct issues 
under the more stringent standard of gross misconduct or a 
tendency to categorize gross misconduct issues as simple 
misconduct. If State 3 were ranked on the basis of its denials 
for gross misconduct (for which the definition corresponds 
with the description of the claimant's behavior used to define 
misconduct in the other five states), it would rank hi the fifth 
rather than in the second quintile.
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In terms of the rate at which nonseparation determina 
tions lead to denials, the high rates in State 3 appear to be 
associated with the low rate at which determinations are 
made. Most likely, given a number of relatively weak spots 
in the procedures for detecting issues, only the most obvious 
issues reach determination, and, hence, the likelihood of 
denial is high. Four weaknesses in detection emerged from 
our examination: (1) a narrowing of the scope of potential 
able and available issues based on eligibility rules; (2) a low 
likelihood of referral by the employment service, and thus a 
low exposure of claimants to the risks of job refusal or to the 
detection of availability issues; (3) inconsistent adherence to 
state policy on work-search requirements; and (4) infrequent 
administration of ERP interviews.
The scope of continuing eligibility issues that can poten 
tially arise in State 3 is somewhat narrowed by legislation 
and regulations that allow claimants who become ill or 
disabled to continue drawing benefits until they are offered a 
job referral or position, at which time they must demonstrate 
an ability to work in order to remain eligible. Although such 
instances may occur relatively infrequently, they will not 
lead to a determination in State 3, whereas they should in 
other states.
The likelihood of exposing claimants to job referrals is low 
in State 3 because of its loose employment-service registra 
tion procedures. Under state policy, initial claimants are ex 
cused from the registration requirement if they expect to be 
recalled within 10 weeks, a long period relative to the period 
hi other states. Moreover, even those who are required to 
register are normally placed in an "inactive status." Brief in 
formation on their skills and experience is recorded and filed 
but is not entered in the active files from which candidates 
for referral are usually selected. No attempt is made to 
match these claimants to jobs unless "active status" (volun-
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tarily registered) individuals do not provide enough referrals 
to meet the demands of employers. This approach to 
registration most likely holds down the rates at which both 
able and available and refusal issues arise.
Although state policy requires ongoing claimants to 
engage in active search if they do not expect to be recalled 
within 10 weeks, we detected inconsistent adherence to this 
policy. One office, although it required claimants to report 
employer contacts, did not appear to enforce this require 
ment by holding a determination when insufficient contacts 
were reported. The other office, according to a respondent, 
did not require claimants to make any employer contacts un 
til after 10 weeks of unemployment. These practices reduce 
the chances of detecting availability issues.
Finally, the difficulties faced by State 3 in adhering to a 
schedule for ERP interviews weaken its ability to detect 
issues. Although ERP interviews are supposed to be held 
every 10 weeks, the average interval when we conducted our 
site visit was 13 weeks. In fact, it was reported that some 
claimants are never scheduled for ERP interviews. In the ur 
ban office of State 3, about 20 percent of the scheduled ERP 
interviews were reported to lead to determinations for failing 
to appear; thus, difficulty in scheduling these interviews 
clearly reduces the number of issues that can be found.
State 4
The denial rate pattern of State 4 is dominated by its very 
low frequency of determinations. For issues pertaining to 
voluntary quit, misconduct, and able/available for work, 
State 4 ranks at the very bottom of the fifth quintile in deter 
minations made, and it ranks in the third quintile for refusal- 
related determinations. However, the rates at which deter 
minations lead to denials diverge. For determinations on 
voluntary quit and able/available issues, State 4 ranks in the
State Characteristics 111
first quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations. 
However, for misconduct and refusal issues, it ranks in the 
fourth and fifth quintiles, respectively. Overall denial rates 
are correspondingly low—in the fourth quintile for refusal 
issues and in the bottom of the fifth quintile for all others. 
The pattern of determination and denial rates in State 4 ap 
pears to be heavily influenced by three factors: (1) very 
restrictive rules on valid reasons for voluntary separation; 
(2) the possible deterrent effects of intake procedures and 
denial penalties; and (3) a more casual approach than seems 
to be true hi some other states for investigating initial claims 
and reviewing ongoing claims.
Of the six states we visited, State 4 is the only one which 
does not allow personal reasons to justify voluntary separa 
tion, requiring that all quits be for reasons that can be at 
tributed to the employer. If the potential claimant popula 
tion of this state behaved in a manner similar to the cor 
responding populations of other states (i.e., quitting for per 
sonal reasons and then applying for benefits at the same 
rates), we would expect State 4 to show a high rate of denial 
relative to other states. In fact, the opposite is true: deter 
minations occur very infrequently, and, although they 
almost always lead to denial, the net denial rate is very low. 
One possible explanation for this pattern is that the potential 
claimant population hi this state is to some degree aware of 
the narrow definition of good cause for quitting, and, conse 
quently, is less likely either to leave jobs voluntarily or to ap 
ply for benefits when they do leave voluntarily.
The possibility that information about the UI program 
may deter individuals from filing claims is supported by two 
other features of the program in State 4. First, unlike any of 
the other states we examined, State 4 provides orientation in 
formation about program eligibility requirements to ap 
plicants before they complete the required claim forms, and
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allows a week-long interval between the initial intake contact 
to identify separation issues and the fact-finding stage at 
which the agency collects information from the claimant. It 
is possible that when claimants learn about the eligibility 
rules, and about the possibility that they might not be eligi 
ble, they may refrain from following up a week later with a 
claim and fact-finding form. However, agency staff did not 
believe that this situation occurred with any significant fre 
quency. If such situations do in fact arise, however, State 4 
would not recognize that a determination was made.
It is also worth noting that State 4 imposes about the most 
severe denial penalty for quitting without good cause: dis 
qualification for the duration of unemployment and until the 
claimant is reemployed for five weeks and earns 10 times the 
weekly benefit amount. The regression analysis results show 
ed that more severe denial penalties for voluntary leaves are 
associated with lower denial rates, an association which our 
hypothesis suggests would be caused at least in part by a 
lower likelihood of ineligibles' applying for benefits. We 
suspect that the difficulty of requalifying for benefits in 
State 4 deters some individuals from applying if they believe 
they have quit without an acceptable cause. Given the nar 
row definition of good cause in State 4, the deterrent effect 
of the severe penalty would affect more individuals than 
would a comparable penalty in other states.
Procedures for reviewing initial and ongoing claims are 
less rigorous in State 4 than in States 1 and 2, and may con 
tribute to the low frequency of determinations. Relative to 
the other states, intake procedures in State 4 do not impose a 
stringent requirement that employer responses on separation 
reasons be obtained before benefits are awarded. If the 
claimant's application has not raised any separation issues, 
and if the employer's response is not received within seven 
days, the agency will not initiate a contact with the employer
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and will proceed with processing the claim. Thus, it is possi 
ble that some quits without good cause or some discharges 
for misconduct will not be detected if the employer is either 
indifferent to or ignorant of the possible effects of the 
benefit award on its account. The review of ongoing claims 
also seems to be undertaken less carefully than in other 
states. Although State 4 requires ongoing claimants to list 
two employer contacts on two different days of the week, 
scrutiny of these reported contacts appears to be minimal, 
and reported contacts are not verified. According to agency 
respondents, only the most outrageously apparent fabrica 
tions of employer contact will prompt a determination.
As we noted in chapter 4, a high proportion of initial 
claims in State 4 are filed by employers for temporarily laid- 
off claimants, and it is worth considering whether this pro 
cedure could explain the very low rate of determinations. 
When employers submit initial claims on behalf of their 
employees, they are probably less likely to be questioned 
than if the same employees were required to file their own 
claims. Consequently, the agency would probably avoid 
making determinations on individuals whose circumstances 
of separation do in fact qualify them for benefits. Thus, such 
a practice should lead to a lower determination rate and to a 
higher rate of denials as a percentage of determinations, but 
should not affect the overall denial rates. The fact that the 
overall denial rate in State 4 is very low suggests that other 
factors, such as those described earlier, are more important.
The extremely low rates of determinations and the very 
high rates at which determinations lead to denials in State 4 
may also partially be a product of the fact that the state per 
forms adjudications centrally for potential disqualifying 
issues. As we pointed out in chapter 4, adjudicators in State 
4 base their determinations primarily on written material for 
warded by local office fact-finders; however, local fact-
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finding in State 4 does not require any hearing which in 
volves both the claimant and the employer. Thus, in some 
cases, it is possible that central adjudicators make their deci 
sions without an adequate knowledge of the facts. The very 
high rate at which centrally performed determinations are 
appealed in State 4 may indicate the respective parties' sun- 
pie distrust of what seems to be a remote decision process, or 
it may indicate that adjudicators' decisions have a tendency 
to be at odds with the facts. The latter hypothesis is sup 
ported to some extent by the high rates at which both 
claimant- and employer-initiated appeals succeed in over 
turning the determination decision. In 1982, the rates at 
which appeals reversed determination decisions ranked State 
4 among the top three states for employer-initiated appeals 
and in the top eight for claimant-initiated appeals.
State 5
Overall denial rates hi State 5 are among the lowest in the 
country, ranking it hi the fifth quintile for all four non- 
monetary eligibility factors examined hi this study. 
However, these low denial rates are due to an interesting pat 
tern of determination rates and denials as a percentage of 
determinations. For quit-related issues, State 5 ranks near 
the bottom of the fifth quintile for determinations and hi the 
fourth quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations. 
For misconduct issues, the state ranks among the lowest for 
determinations, but in the highest quintile for the percentage 
of determinations that lead to denials. Determinations for 
able/available issues are performed very frequently (the state 
ranks in the first quintile), but lead to denials less than 15 
percent of the tune (which ranks State 5 in the lowest quintile 
for denials as a percentage of determinations). Finally, 
refusal-related determinations occur very infrequently (at a 
fifth-quintile rate) but frequently lead to denials (ranking the 
state in the top of the second quintile in terms of this 
measure).
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Based on our site visit, it appears that State 5 is generally 
poorly equipped to detect potential eligibility issues and to 
report actions as determinations. Only the most clear-cut 
issues are likely to reach the determination stage; hence, 
denial rates as a percentage of determinations could be ex 
pected to be quite high. This general observation is based on 
(1) the state's process for screening potential issues informal 
ly at intake, and (2) the absence of any effective employment 
service registration or work-search requirements.
Separation issues that would lead to determinations in 
other states appear frequently to be resolved hi State 5 before 
the investigation reaches the point at which it is formally 
recognized as a determination. Responding to pressures to 
adhere to time standards for granting initial payments and 
resolving determinations, State 5 conducts initial fact- 
finding discussions with both the claimant and the employer 
immediately upon discovering a potential issue at intake. 
When these discussions indicate no reason for benefit denial, 
no determination is counted in the state's records, since no 
claim has yet been submitted for a benefit week. This screen 
ing process undoubtedly contributes to the extremely low 
frequency with which determinations are made for separa 
tion issues.
A number of procedures in State 5 make it unlikely that 
ongoing eligibility issues will be detected. First, requirements 
for registration with the employment service are very mild 
compared with other states, and do not appear to be enforc 
ed consistently. Only claimants who do not expect to be 
recalled within 13 weeks are supposed to register, and the of 
fices we visited did not appear to enforce registration re 
quirements hi keeping with policy. One office excused initial 
claimants from referral to the employment service if they 
had any prospect of recall; the other office referred unat 
tached claimants only after 13 weeks of unemployment. 
Moreover, the state has no requirement for active work
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search. Claimants can thus satisfy availability requirements 
by expressing only a passive interest in working or a will 
ingness to work, rather than having to demonstrate that they 
are actively engaged in work search. Questions posed on 
weekly claim cards allow claimants to interpret then* 
behavior rather than to state simple facts (e.g., "Did you 
refuse work without good cause!"). Finally, State 5 insists 
that information on job refusals come from the employer or 
employment service; the agency will not note any refusals 
reported voluntarily by claimants, nor will it initiate a deter 
mination based on such a report. Given the very low 
likelihood that the employment service will refer claimants to 
employers, failing to act upon claimants' reports severely 
reduces any chances the agency has of detecting those 
refusals that do occur.
In light of these general expectations about low determina 
tion rates, some explanation is clearly necessary for the 
anomalously high incidence of determinations for 
able/available issues hi State 5. One possible explanation lies 
hi the state's approach to scheduling personal appearances 
for claims filing and ERP interviews: appearances are 
scheduled for a particular day and hour; the failure to ap 
pear at the correct hour is noted on the claims file; and, upon 
the third such occurrence, a determination is initiated to 
determine whether the claimant is available for work. Rely 
ing heavily on personal claims filing would raise the in 
cidence of such determinations, and, indeed, heavy personal 
filing was reported in the urban office we visited. We suspect 
that claimants may have difficulty in complying with this 
tightly scheduled approach for personal reporting, even 
when their difficulty does not necessarily reflect their 
unavailability for work. This interpretation is borne out by 
the low rate at which determinations for able/available 
issues lead to denials. Thus, although State 5 may have little 
chance of detecting inadequate claimant responses to job or
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referral offers, frequent occasions may occur when failing to 
comply with reporting procedures leads to counted deter 
minations.
When detection procedures are weak, we expect that only 
the clearest issues will reach determination, and, hence, that 
a high percentage of determinations will lead to denials. This 
expectation is true for misconduct and refusal issues in State 
5. However, the state ranks very low for quit and 
able/available issues. In terms of quit issues, we attribute the 
low rate to a fairly liberal definition of personal reasons as 
good cause for quitting. In terms of able/available issues, 
State 5 also seems relatively liberal in that it allows claimants 
somewhat greater latitude hi restricting the scope of their job 
search and availability than do the other states. Claimants 
are allowed to limit the hours and shifts they will work, and 
no recognized rule of thumb exists hi local offices about how 
quickly and to what extent claimants should adjust their job 
expectations as time elapses. Thus, the standards by which 
issues are to be judged when determinations arise do not pro 
vide a particularly strong basis for denials.
The low rate at which determinations for able/available 
issues lead to denials is probably caused most directly by the 
high rate at which determinations are made and the frequen 
cy with which they arise from procedural rather than 
substantive situations. The rate may also be held down by 
the relatively moderate standard for availability set by the 
state, which requires the claimant to be available for work 
only for the majority of the week. Since two days of 
unavailability do not justify a denial, determinations 
prompted by claimants' reporting at the wrong time prob 
ably rarely lead to denial.
State 6
The denial rate pattern of State 6 resembles the patterns of 
State 4 and 5. Overall, denial rates are low—in the fifth quin-
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tile for quit, misconduct, and able/available issues, and in 
the bottom of the third quintile for refusal issues. These 
denial rates reflect the pattern of determination rates, which 
also fall in the fifth quintile for the first two areas, in the bot 
tom of the fourth quintile for able/available issues, and in 
the bottom of the third quintile for refusals. As does State 5, 
this state ranks quite high in terms of the rate at which 
misconduct-related determinations lead to denials (in the 
first quintile). The rate of denials relative to determinations 
is moderate (in the third quintile) for quit and refusal issues, 
and very low for able/available issues.
For both separation and nonseparation issues, we iden 
tified certain procedures which probably contribute to the 
relatively low rates at which determination issues are raised. 
At intake, the procedures in State 6 do not take advantage of 
information as fully or actively as do procedures in other 
states, particularly in States 1 and 2. For example, claims in 
terviewers are explicitly not to note separation issues that 
might be suggested by claimants' answers to questions on the 
intake form; they are to note only those issues that pertain to 
the claimants' ability to and availability for work. A separa 
tion issue determination occurs only when an employer pro 
tests. Moreover, procedures are not the most favorable for 
obtaining employer information that could lead to a deter 
mination. The form that might elicit an employer protest is 
somewhat ambiguous, asking simply whether any reason ex 
ists to question the claimant's eligibility, rather than asking 
for the reason for separation. The form sent to employers 
demands a detailed written explanation of circumstances in 
order to support a protest. The burden placed on employers 
to lodge a protest is clearly greater in this state than hi States 
1 or 2.
Before conducting a formal determination, claims ex 
aminers in State 6 often want to confirm the existence of a 
reasonable cause for denial by clarifying information provid-
State Characteristics 119
ed by employers before scheduling a determination hearing. 
The necessity for such clarification arises most frequently for 
misconduct issues, for which the determination rate in State 
6 ranks lowest. State 6 respondents noted that, although 
there is no intention to discourage employers from continu 
ing with a protest, a significant number of such clarification 
discussions between the examiner and the employer lead 
simply to dropping the issue. This clarification process thus 
contributes to the low determination rate for separation 
issues.
The existence of nonseparation issues seems relatively 
unlikely hi State 6 because of the minimal work-search re 
quirements and the lack of resources for ERP interviews 
reported during our site visits. In contrast to States 1, 2, 3, 
and 4, State 6 has no blanket work-search requirement which 
affects all unattached claimants. Registration with the 
employment service fulfills the legal requirements for labor- 
market exposure. If claims staff question the strength of a 
claimant's connection to the labor market, they can require 
that claimant to file personally and to document active work- 
search efforts; however, fewer than 1 percent of all claimants 
are in fact required to do so. For all other claimants, no 
regular report of employer contacts is required.
In addition, the thoroughness of ERP interviews in State 6 
was severely undermined by staffing cuts. Consequently, 
ERP interviews hi one office were being held every eight 
weeks, as scheduled, only for claimants whose availability 
and labor-market attachment had been ques 
tioned—specifically, those in high-demand occupations or 
those who are unemployed for a long time. For other 
claimants, ERP interviews had slipped to intervals of 12 or 
more weeks. In the other office, staffing problems cut back 
the frequency of ERP interviews, so that none had been con 
ducted for a period of over five months prior to our visit.
120 State Characteristics
Despite these problems, which could be expected to keep 
nonseparation issues to a low level, it is worth noting that the 
rate for refusal-related determinations in State 6 is higher 
than for other issues, as is the rate at which these determina 
tions lead to denials. One possible explanation is that State 6 
attempts to use the employment service to place UI claimants 
to a greater extent than do the other states we examined. At 
the time we visited, the agency had set a target that called for 
allotting 19 percent of the employment service referrals to 
claimants. This policy may lead to a greater number of refer 
rals for UI claimants than is true elsewhere and, consequent 
ly, to more situations hi which the claimant's response to the 
referral is open to challenge. The policies in State 6 seem to 
suggest that claimants who are eager for work are expected 
to conduct work-search activities independently, and that lit 
tle purpose is served by forcing all claimants to provide a 
routine list of employer contacts. Conversely, the agency ac 
cepts a greater responsibility for using its own resources to 
direct claimants toward job opportunities than do the other 
states we visited and, hence, expose more claimants to situa 
tions hi which they could refuse jobs.
C General Conclusions About the
Nonmonetary Determination Process
Despite the cautions expressed earlier about the difficulty 
of drawing clear inferences from observations of a limited 
number of states and from qualitative or subjective data, it is 
important to provide some assessment of what we have 
learned from the regression and process analyses. Our 
general conclusions are presented here in full recognition 
that they can serve only as guidelines for new policy and 
management initiatives, not as prescriptions for success. The 
discussion below deals with five topics: (1) the importance of 
issue-detection relative to fact-finding and adjudication; 
(2) factors that appear to affect success in detecting potential
State Characteristics 121
eligibility issues; (3) the significance of the severity of 
penalties imposed for denials; (4) the importance of clear 
policies and procedures; and (5) the organization of the fact- 
finding and adjudication process.
"Finding Issues" vs. "Deciding Issues"
State denial rates may vary to some extent because of dif 
ferences in the behavior of potential claimants. Population 
characteristics and the public's perception of the UI program 
may lead to differences either in the rates at which 
unemployed individuals file for benefits or in the rates at 
which individuals take actions that lead to their unemploy 
ment. However, it appears to us that much of the variation 
in denial rates among the six states we examined can be at 
tributed to differences in how well the states are able to deny 
benefits to individuals who have claimed benefits but who do 
not conform to program requirements. This denial process 
consists of three stages: (1) the definition of policy which 
stipulates eligibility requirements; (2) the policies and pro 
cedures which detect potential eligibility issues pertaining to 
individual claimants; and (3) the process of fact-finding and 
decisionmaking for identified issues.
Given a stated set of eligibility requirements, we quite 
strongly conclude that the ability of a state to deny benefits 
to the ineligible population will depend primarily on the ef 
fectiveness with which it detects determination issues, rather 
than on the consistency with which its determinations lead to 
denials. States with high determination rates also have high 
denial rates; moreover, even when a state denies benefits hi a 
very high percentage of determinations, the net denial rate 
will be low if the determination rate is also low.
Determination rates dominate net denial rates hi part 
because they vary more widely than do denials as a percent 
age of determinations. In table 5.1, the standard deviations
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divided by the means of determination and denial rates are 
presented for the six sample states and for all fifty-one state 
jurisdictions. This useful measure of variability is consistent 
ly higher for the rate of determinations than for denials as a 
percentage of determinations. The data on which this table is 
based provide clear examples of this difference. In the six- 
state sample, determination rates for voluntary separations 
ranged from about 21 determinations per 1,000 contacts to 
over 100, whereas denials as a percentage of determinations 
for the same issue ranged only between about 73 percent and 
94 percent.
Table 5.1
Variability of Rates of Determination 
and Denials/Determinations
(Standard deviations/mean)
____Six-state sample_______51 state jurisdictions___
Denials as Denials as
Determination percent of Determination percent of











Determination rates vary more than the rates at which 
determinations lead to denials for several reasons. The pro 
cess of fact-finding and adjudication is more administrative 
ly confined than the process of identifying determination 
issues. Fact-finding and adjudication are conducted by a 
smaller staff whose actions and decisions can be scrutinized 
and reviewed more closely than is true for the claims takers 
and clerical staff whose functions only contribute to issue 
detection. The adjudication process is constrained by 
legislative and judicial due process and timeliness standards, 
and is thus difficult to modify by managerial decision. 
Moreover, the adjudication process within a particular state
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has its basic ground rules in state policy, which may be more 
or less explicit but is relatively stable. However, the frequen 
cy with which issues are detected is affected not only by 
eligibility policy, but also by a wide range of administrative 
guidelines and procedures that may vary from office to of 
fice in their application, and that may be adhered to closely 
or loosely depending upon available staff resources, the 
pressure of claimant traffic, and the level of agency 
managerial control. Consequently, the rates of issue detec 
tion we observed vary much more widely than does the abili 
ty of states to deny benefits for identified issues.
By implication, policy and managerial initiatives to im 
prove the detection of determination issues are considerably 
more feasible than those to improve the adjudication process 
itself. In fact, using the rate at which determinations lead to 
denials as a performance measure would serve little purpose. 
Based on our examination of these six states, it appears that 
where denials as a percentage of determinations are unusual 
ly high, the high rate most likely reflects deficiencies in issue 
detection rather than a particularly effective adjudication 
process.
Casting the "detection net" more broadly to expand the 
catch of issues for determination appears to be associated 
with less "efficient" detection, in that a higher percentage of 
issues will be resolved by awarding benefits. However, the 
purpose of the overall determination process is not to deny 
benefits efficiently; it is to ensure that a high percentage of 
ineligibles are denied, and that the procedures that are 
followed convey to claimants the seriousness of the agency 
about enforcing eligibility standards. Increasing denials by a 
process which examines more cases, considers them 
equitably, and ends up denying benefits for a lower percen 
tage of determinations is consistent with those goals.
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However, achieving a higher rate of determinations has 
cost implications. Increased staff resources may be necessary 
to achieve the higher rate of detection, and increased 
resources are very likely to be necessary to process more 
cases through adjudication. In the short term, increasing the 
number of determinations performed will increase federal 
reimbursements for administrative costs. Federal reimburse 
ment for administrative costs is based on estimated "MPUs" 
(minutes per unit) of staff time required for each function in 
claims processing, determination, and other UI activities. 
For a given year, once MPUs are estimated from ad 
ministrative activity studies and negotiated with the U.S. 
Department of Labor, increasing the volume of any par 
ticular activity (such as determinations) will lead to a cor 
responding increase in total reimbursement. However, 
because detecting additional (and possibly more complex) 
issues may require a greater average labor effort per deter 
mination than do those issues that are currently found, the 
increase in federal reimbursement may not adequately cover 
the extra state cost. In the longer term, investing ad 
ministrative resources in a tighter detection effort and a 
greater volume of determinations may raise a state's MPU 
and thus increase the rate at which the state's determinations 
are reimbursed. However, the increase in federal reimburse 
ment might not match the increase in the resources devoted 
to tighter detection efforts by the state, since no assurance 
exists that state requests based on MPU studies will be ac 
cepted as submitted to the funding-decision process. In both 
the short and long terms, therefore, resource constraints 
must be kept in mind if an effort is to be made to increase the 
rate of determinations.
Raising determination rates within resource constraints 
necessitates assessing the effectiveness of current detection 
methods and considering alternative uses of staff. For exam 
ple, among the six states we examined, considerable varia-
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tion exists in the extent to which they rely on the routine 
reporting and review of employer contacts as a method for 
identifying work-search deficiencies and availability issues, 
as opposed to a more tailored scrutiny of how well in 
dividuals are demonstrating the type of work-search effort 
reasonably suited to their employment history and prospects. 
These represent two very different uses of resources for 
detecting issues. We will return to this issue of reporting and 
review in the next section.
Factors That Affect Determination Rates
Our examination of the six sample states uncovered dif 
ferences in the methods by which the UI agencies detect 
eligibility issues for determination. This section provides a 
summary of which approaches appear to be more effective 
than the others.
Before pointing out state detection procedures that seem 
effective, we should acknowledge that determination rates 
are not a perfect measure of the ability of an agency to iden 
tify issues. In at least some cases, a few states, such as sample 
States 5 and 6, perform some type of informal investigation 
upon detecting a potential issue, and drop some issues before 
they reach the point at which they are counted as a deter 
mination. Some state procedures tend to create issues which 
focus on the ability of claimants to comply with reporting 
procedures, but which only rarely lead to benefit denials. For 
example, the high rate of able/available determinations in 
State 5 seems to be caused by reporting practices rather than 
by the detection of substantive issues. Thus, determination 
rates may understate or overstate the ability of an agency to 
find substantive questions about a claimant's eligibility.
Procedures that lower determination rates by resolving 
some issues through informal inquiry prior to determination 
could be viewed as an effective managerial tool because they
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hold down the burden and costs imposed on the determina 
tion process. However, if dropping issues prior to determina 
tion is indicative of a general tendency to avoid recognizing 
issues and bringing them to determination, and if it reflects a 
low managerial emphasis on finding issues, it instead 
becomes part of a larger issue. The states we observed which 
did undertake some type of screening, even though it may 
not explicitly be recognized as such, generally follow less ac 
tive and persistent procedures for detecting issues. States 5 
and 6 have instituted relatively weak procedures for obtain 
ing employer input on separation issues, and take relatively 
little initiative themselves in identifying issues. Moreover, 
they do not impose an effective work-search requirement on 
most claimants, eliminating one potentially important way 
to test the ongoing availability of claimants for work. Thus, 
even though the determination rate is not a perfect measure 
of issue detection, it must be viewed as an important in 
dicator.
To detect separation issues, we would emphasize two prac 
tices that seemed to contribute to high determination rates in 
our sample of six states. The first practice would be to ini 
tiate the determination process based on information from 
claimants, employers, or the agency itself, rather than 
restricting acceptable sources for identifying particular 
issues. State 6, for instance, insists that separation deter 
minations be initiated by employer protests and will not ini 
tiate a determination on the basis of claimants' statements at 
intake. State 5 does not recognize ongoing claimants' reports 
of job refusals; it relies entirely on notification by the 
employment service that the claimant refused a job to which 
he/she was referred or on notification by employers, at then- 
own initiative, that claimants refused jobs offered to them 
through their own search activity. We frequently heard 
respondents from other states say that most issues arise from 
information presented by claimants. Even if the statements
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of claimants are ignored, some issues will of course be raised 
by another party, but it seems likely that at least some issues 
will consequently go undetected.
If a state wishes to maximize its ability to find issues, ini 
tiating a determination regardless of the source of informa 
tion seems particularly important because of the possibility 
that some issues may be important to the agency but less im 
portant to the employer. For instance, employers which pay 
a maximum tax rate may conclude that the burden of pro 
testing a claim, documenting it fully, and participating in an 
adjudication hearing is unwarranted, since the individual 
case will have no direct effect on their tax burden. From the 
agency perspective, however, such an issue might be worth 
pursuing, since each unmerited award of benefits contributes 
to program costs and, in the longer run, places upward 
pressure on employers' taxes.
A second guideline for detecting separation issues effec 
tively, and one which clearly pertains to the first guideline, is 
to insist upon obtaining simple factual information from 
employers about the reasons for the job separation. We 
observed two practices that deviated from this principle. One 
was failing to ensure that employers' responses about separa 
tion reasons are received before initial claims are processed. 
In states where forms are sent to employers and no follow-up 
is performed if the response has not arrived before the first 
weekly claim, it appears that the agency implicitly assumes 
that the purpose of the form is simply to allow the employer 
an opportunity to protest. Where persistent follow-up is 
undertaken to obtain an employer's response, procedures in 
effect recognize the principle that it is the agency and not the 
employer which bears responsibility for protecting the in 
tegrity of the eligibility process. When employers' responses 
are optional, some real issues may go undetected. The sec 
ond practice that departed from this guideline was asking
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employers whether or not they had any reason to question a 
claimant's eligibility, rather than simply asking for a factual 
statement about the circumstances surrounding separation. 
The former approach allows employers to decide whether an 
issue should be pursued; the latter emphasizes the agency's 
role in making that judgment.
Determination rates for nonseparation issues seem to 
reflect three general factors that vary from state to state: 
(1) the scope of work-search requirements and the methods 
used to monitor compliance; (2) the purposefulness and fre 
quency with which claimants are questioned about ongoing 
eligibility issues; and (3) the consistency with which ongoing 
claims are reviewed.
It seems clear that a formal requirement which stipulates 
that claimants engage in their own active work search is a 
necessary foundation for effectively assessing their exposure 
to the labor market as a measure of their availability for 
work. Without such a requirement, the UI agency has no 
basis for questioning any claimant's availability for work 
based on a lack of search effort, and it has no basis for im 
plementing procedures to monitor work-search activities. 
Ironically, State 5, the only one in our sample with no formal 
work-search requirement at all, ranked very high in the fre 
quency with which it made able/available determinations, 
but the overall denial rate for those issues was so low that we 
concluded that procedural rather than substantive issues pro 
duced the high rate.
A formal work-search requirement is necessary but not 
sufficient to ensure that availability and refusal issues are 
identified. The procedural definitions of evidence required 
to document adequate work search also seem to affect the 
determination rate. Two major options seem available: 
(1) to require a minimum number of weekly contacts with 
employers and to report them on claim cards; and (2) to
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prescribe the types of search efforts that are expected of 
claimants in their particular occupations, and to review 
periodically how well they are measuring up to such stan 
dards. Our process analysis indicates that either approach 
can be effective, but only to the extent that it is taken 
seriously. Without a serious review of and consistent 
response to insufficient employer contacts, routine weekly 
reporting of contacts is open to serious abuse and may serve 
little detection purpose. 1 In State 4, for example, employer 
contacts are regularly reported, but only the most apparent 
fabrications of employer names prompt determinations, and 
the frequency of determinations on availability issues is at 
the bottom of the state ranking. Under the more flexible ap 
proach hi which claimants are clearly required to conduct in 
dependent work search but to report their activities only at 
fairly long intervals during ERPs, some possibility exists that 
less eager claimants will not feel compelled to look for work. 
In State 1, which uses this approach, it appears that suffi 
cient resources are devoted to assessing the adequacy of in 
dividual search efforts, because the frequency of availability 
determinations ranks high in the second quintile. Either 
method can work if carried out thoroughly.
Determination rates and, consequently, denial rates also 
seem to depend on the purposefulness and frequency with 
which claimants' ongoing eligibility is questioned. Two par 
ticular aspects of ongoing eligibility review are important: 
the manner in which questions are posed to claimants on 
weekly or biweekly claim cards, and the frequency and 
substance of ERP interviews. Questions on claim cards 
should request simple factual statements from claimants, 
rather than allowing them to judge whether their behavior is 
within eligibility norms and incorporating that judgment in 
their answers. For example, State 5, which asks claimants 
whether they refused a job without good cause, ranks in the 
fifth quintile for refusal-related determinations. This claim
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card question may not account entirely for that low rate, but 
probably contributes to it. Claim card questions can usefully 
reflect an overall approach for identifying possible eligibility 
issues rather than clear ones. For example, State 1 asks 
claimants whether they were available for work during the 
entire week, even though one day of unavailability is accept 
able. Asking the claimant whether he/she was available 
"every day but one" would indicate that availability is not 
an absolute standard, and would perhaps encourage some 
claimants to shrink their reported periods of unavailability 
down to the apparently required size when completing their 
claims reports. State 1 ranks in the first quintile for 
able/available determinations.
For most claimants in the states we examined, the Eligibili 
ty Review Process interview is the only tune after the initial 
claim has been filed that the agency has personal contact 
with the claimant under routine procedures. The informa 
tion uncovered in these interviews can raise issues, as can 
merely scheduling them and observing claimants' ability to 
appear at the requested time. The states we examined varied 
widely in the frequency with which they plan to and are able 
to schedule ERPs—from State 2, which holds them every 
four to seven weeks with unattached claimants, to State 5, 
which in practice conducts ERP interviews only every thir 
teen weeks on average. States that schedule more frequent 
ERP interviews tend to have higher determination rates for 
nonseparation issues.
The rigor and consistency with which ongoing claims 
reports are reviewed by UI staff also vary considerably from 
state to state, and are probably an important factor in the 
ability of states to detect ongoing eligibility issues. In some 
states, such as hi State 2, it appears that the "wrong" answer 
to a claim card question automatically prompts a determina 
tion, and an insufficient number of reported employer con-
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tacts leads to a warning to the claimant on the first occur 
rence and a determination on the second. In others, such as 
States 3 and 4, adherence to policy is spotty. In State 3, 
neither office we visited enforced employer contact re 
quirements according to state policy; hi State 4, the process 
of reviewing employer contacts was described as cursory. 
State 2 ranks in the middle of the fourth quintile for all 
nonseparation determinations, considerably above States 3 
and 4, which rank, respectively, in the middle and bottom of 
the fifth quintile.
Importance of Denial Penalties
The severity of penalties imposed on denied claimants can 
potentially affect the integrity of the eligibility determination 
process and program finances in two ways. First, more 
severe penalties can affect the behavior of claimants and 
potential claimants—for example, by deterring individuals 
from taking such actions as quitting or refusing a job. Know 
ing that benefits will be denied for the duration of unemploy 
ment is probably a stronger deterrent than knowing that 
benefits will be received after a fixed number of weeks of 
denial. More severe penalties may also be more likely to 
discourage individuals from applying when they suspect that 
their actions will make them ineligible. Both of these effects 
were incorporated hi our hypothesis about the effects of dis 
qualification for the duration of unemployment on denial 
rates for voluntary separation, misconduct, and refusal. The 
more individuals are deterred from such actions or 
discouraged from filing, the lower the denial rates are ex 
pected to be, and the regression analysis seems to support 
that hypothesis.
The second way hi which the severity of penalties can af 
fect the UI program is by influencing administrative 
behavior hi the determination process. For purposes of for 
mulating hypotheses for the regression analysis reported in
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chapter 2, we explicitly assumed that the severity of denial 
penalties does not affect the likelihood of denial once a 
determination is initiated. All of the six states in our process 
analysis sample impose disqualification for the duration of 
unemployment for quit, misconduct, and refusal; thus, there 
is not much variation with which to test the possibility of 
such an effect. However, State 3 lends some support to the 
idea that the severity of the penalty may in fact affect the 
likelihood of denial, although not as a result of any clear 
policy directive. The two-level definitions of voluntary quit 
and misconduct in State 3 seem to give claims staff the op 
tion of imposing milder penalties based on less imposing 
evidence against the claimant. In effect, it becomes easier to 
justify denial and perhaps easier to deny benefits because the 
effects on the claimant are less severe.
Although penalties that deny benefits for a certain number 
of weeks may lead to more denial decisions than would dis 
qualification for the duration of unemployment, the amount 
of new employment required to requalify after a dis 
qualification is probably too subtle a variation to affect 
either claimant behavior or adjudicators' decisions. In our 
six-state sample, requalification requirements ranged from 
five weeks to ten weeks of new employment earnings; two 
states also required four or five weeks of elapsed time in new 
employment. We could not discern any indication that 
tougher requalification requirements had any effect on the 
tendency either of claimants to apply for benefits or of staff 
to deny them.
Although less severe penalties may lead to more denials, 
milder penalties may not be a desirable policy, and par 
ticularly not as part of a two-level definition of eligibility 
rules. On the one hand, it appears to us that defining two 
degrees of violation may mean that issues which actually 
warrant denial under the more demanding standard may be 
less energetically pursued. On the other hand, this arrange-
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ment may mean that both the claimants and the agency will 
exhibit a tendency to accept benefit denials under the looser 
standard without thoroughly developing the arguments that 
would support the award of benefits and no penalty.
Furthermore, less severe penalties, even if they lead to in 
creased denial rates, may not restrain overall program costs 
more effectively. The regression results and some of our pro 
cess analysis observations suggest that more severe penalties 
may be associated with lower denial rates because they deter 
ineligibles from applying for benefits, and possibly deter 
behavior which leads to unemployment. UI benefits can be 
held down by this deterrent effect without the administrative 
cost of processing applications, perhaps to the same extent as 
increased denial rates.
Clear Policies and Standards
The states we visited varied dramatically in the extent to 
which they made UI policies and procedures available in a 
clear, organized form, or even consistently recognized them 
in more informal ways. At one end of the spectrum, States 1 
and 2 have very detailed regulations that provide clear 
guidance as to the requirements imposed on claimants and 
how eligibility requirements are to be interpreted and applied 
to a wide variety of claimant circumstances. In sharp con 
trast are states such as State 3, in which regulations do not 
provide definitions of nonmonetary eligibility requirements 
or interpretive guidance, and in which we could find no cur 
rently maintained, comprehensive set of procedures to fill 
this gap. Not surprisingly, we found that hi states that had 
more comprehensive and detailed written policy and pro 
cedures, the staffs understanding of state policy was more 
accurate and more consistent.
Detailed and specific policies tend to restrict the amount 
of discretion that can be exercised by claims staff in con 
sidering each claimant's case. To the extent that the clarity of
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defined policy is effectively communicated to line staff, its 
effect should be to increase the consistency with which 
similar cases are treated in the determination process, which 
is a desirable end. One legitimate concern, of course, is that 
very detailed, specific regulations may make it impossible for 
determination decisions to respond to the subtle differences 
in individual claimants' situations which might not be dif 
ferentiated in program rules. This problem was in fact 
described by some agency respondents in State 2. Although 
claims staff recognized that many claimants, particularly in 
rural areas, had few employment options open to them and 
few target employers which could be contacted, they main 
tained that their specific regulations forced them to enforce 
work-search requirements rigorously.
However, detailed and specific program guidelines need 
not prompt claims staff to undertake unreasonable enforce 
ment activities, and probably provide greater protection for 
claimants than do nebulous and unwritten rules. For in 
stance, the rules in State 2 could describe circumstances in 
which new employer contacts every week do not constitute a 
reasonable expectation. Even if procedures require claimants 
to report a specified number of employer contacts per week, 
state policy could also allow adjudicators to consider the oc 
cupations of individuals and their specific job markets in 
performing determinations prompted by insufficient 
reported contacts. In contrast, the lack of clearly written 
rules makes it more difficult for adjudicators to justify then* 
decisions, and more difficult for claimants to understand the 
standards they must meet and to prepare arguments in their 
defense. Agency adjudicators then apply unwritten stan 
dards which may be understood and interpreted quite dif 
ferently by different adjudicators, and leave claimants with 
no reasonable basis for predicting the relationship between 
their behavior and the adjudication outcome. In such cir 
cumstances, high standards of due process may be difficult 
to achieve.
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Organization of Fact-Finding and Adjudication
Three variable factors were observed in the manner in 
which the sample states conduct fact-finding and adjudica 
tion. First, states varied in the extent to which they insisted 
on conducting all fact-finding within the context of a 
recognized determination process, as opposed to allowing 
some informal fact-finding and issue resolution before the 
process was considered a determination. Second, some varia 
tion exists in the extent to which states relied on in-person in 
terviews in which the claimant and (where relevant) the 
employer were present, as opposed to telephone fact-finding 
and separate contacts with the employer and claimant. Final 
ly, in one state, fact-finding was performed by one staff per 
son in the local office, and the determination decision was 
formulated and written up by a different person in the state 
office. In all other states in our sample, fact-finding and ad 
judication were performed by the same person in the local 
office. Our examination of the six states leads us to three 
general conclusions about the effects of these variations.
The first conclusion, already expressed hi other contexts 
earlier, is that a broad view should be taken of the types of 
information that justify inquiry and some form of deter 
mination. Identifying more issues, rather than trying to iden 
tify only those issues that stand a good chance of leading to 
denial, seems more likely to lead to the effective denial of a 
high percentage of truly ineligible cases. However, casting 
the broad net for potential issues certainly increases the 
workload imposed on staff who conduct fact-finding and 
determinations.
Thus, the second conclusion is that agencies must obvious 
ly deal in some way with the workload burdens imposed by 
high frequencies hi the determination process. We can 
distinguish between two approaches that we observed. Some 
states, by conducting some informal clarification and fact-
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finding before the formal determination process, are able to 
eliminate some issues before reaching the point at which a 
formal written decision and notification are necessary. This 
approach reduces the workload to some extent by avoiding 
part of the work required in a formal determination. The 
second approach is simply to improve the efficiency of the 
determination process. For example, State 2, which has 
detailed regulations and a computer system capable of 
generating notifications (including standard text selected by 
adjudicators), maintains a production rate estimated at over 
100 determinations per week by each adjudicator when work 
volume demands it. In contrast, State 6, which has a com 
pletely manual system, sets a production target of one- 
quarter of the maximum production rate of State 2 and ap 
parently has difficulty meeting that target. 2 To be sure, the 
tendency in State 2 to perform determinations whenever any 
issue is raised probably creates a determination workload 
which includes more straightforward and quickly resolvable 
issues than would be true hi State 6, in which some obvious 
issues are eliminated before reaching the determination pro 
cess. This difference, however, does not seem likely to ac 
count for the substantial differences in overall productivity. 
As we observed earlier, issue screening seems very often 
associated with other practices that may prevent valid issues 
from being identified. Thus, improving the efficiency of the 
determination process seems to represent a sounder course 
for dealing with resource problems than would efforts to 
avoid the formalities of the determination procedure.
Finally, our observations in the six states underscore the 
importance of maximizing the information available to the 
adjudicator who is responsible for making determination 
decisions, for the sake of rendering informed decisions that 
promote confidence hi the thoroughness and equitability of 
the determination process, and to avoid frequent recourse to 
the appeals process. Two states that we examined pointed
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out this issue particularly clearly. State 4, which conducts 
most determinations centrally, ranks very high both in the 
frequency of appeals and in the frequency with which deter 
mination decisions are overturned in appeals. Although cen 
tral adjudication was initially adopted to reduce the costs of 
determination, it is possible that the same decision has caus 
ed an increase in the cost of the appeals process, which hi 
1982 had to be undertaken for almost one of every four 
determination decisions. In State 2, although determinations 
are performed locally, for some reason employers tend not 
to participate in the determination hearings, even when they 
may have raised the determination issue. Respondents 
reported that employers participate in fewer than 25 percent 
of determination fact-finding interviews to which they are in 
vited. The apparent result, however, is that determination 
decisions are more likely to be challenged by employers; for 
example, hi 1982, employers in State 2 initiated appeals on 
about 6 percent of all determinations, a rate exceeded in only 
one or two other states. Moreover, these appeals were 
unusually successful, resulting in a reversal about 38 percent 
of the time, a success rate which ranks among the three 
highest in the country.
Some tension obviously exists between the goals of con 
ducting determinations efficiently and maximizing the infor 
mation that is developed through fact-finding. Insisting that 
employers and claimants be present for all fact-finding inter 
views in which both are relevant is not only infeasible but 
would also substantially increase the costs of the process—in 
many cases unnecessarily. Some states conduct fact-finding 
hearings by telephone or perform separate contacts to gather 
information from the parties involved. No extreme solutions 
are suggested, but two concluding suggestions are offered. 
First, determination decisionmaking by staff who are not in 
volved in fact-finding, using primarily written summaries of 
facts and without personal contact with the parties, may be
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counterproductive. Second, states should encourage relevant 
parties to participate in a determination whenever it appears 
that then* interests are at stake and that there is some chance 
that they have further information or rebuttals to offer.
NOTES
1. The importance of such review is highlighted by the results of the UI 
Random Audit pilot test, which showed that the major source of UI 
overpayments was lack of adherence to the work test. See Jerry L. 
Kingston, Paul L. Burgess, and Robert D. St. Louis, "The Unemploy 
ment Insurance Random Audit Program: Some Results and Implica 
tions," Unemployment Insurance Service, Employment and Training 
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, November 1985.
2. Study MPUs in these two states reflect these productivity differences. 
For FY1983, State 6 had a study MPU of over 115 minutes on intrastate 
separation issue determinations, as compared with less than 48 minutes 
for State 2. MPUs for nonseparation issues were almost 75 minutes for 
State 6 and just under 35 minutes for State 2.
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